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I. Introduction
Sovereign immunity, the right of a sovereign to refuse to appear
as a defendant in court, has been a principal topic of a recent
Supreme Court focus on states' rights. Although the textual
codification of state sovereign immunity, the Eleventh Amendment,
by its terms prohibits only suits brought against a state in federal
court by a citizen of another state or by a citizen of a foreign nation,
the Court has pronounced the states immune from a far more
expansive list of suits: lawsuits brought by citizens of the same state, 1
by foreign nations, 2 by Indian tribes, 3 by public corporations,4 by a

*Attorney, United States Department of Commerce. The views expressed herein are
mine alone and do not necessarily represent those of any other person or entity.
1. See Hans v. Lousiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
2. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
3. See Blatchford v. Native Viii. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991); see also Idaho v.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261,268-69 (1997) (reaffirming Blatchford).
4. See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900).
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government when a private party is the real party in interest,5 by
private parties under admiralty law,6 by private parties under various
Article I legislation in federal court,7 by private parties under various
Article I legislation in state courts,8 by private parties for state law
claims in federal court under pendent or supplemental jurisdiction,9
and by private parties before agency administrative proceedings. 10
On the other hand, the Court has refused to afford states
immunity from suits brought under appropriate legislation enforcing
the Fourteenth Amendment/ 1 from appeals to the Supreme Court
from state courts, 12 from suits brought by the federal government or
its agencies, 13 from suits brought by states, 14 from suits by private
parties in a different state's court, 15 from suits where the state has
5. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); see also Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 745 n.21 (1981) ("[A]n original action between two States only
violates the Eleventh Amendment if the plaintiff State is actually suing to recover for
injuries to specific individuals.").
6. See In reNew York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921).
7. See Coil. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666 (1999) (Trademarks); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coli. Sav.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (Interstate Commerce Clause and Patent Clause); Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Indian Commerce Clause).
8. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
9. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
10. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S 743 (2002).
11. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
12. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); see also McKesson Corp. v.
Fla. Alcohol & Tobacco Div., 496 U.S. 18, 26-29 (1990) (reaffirming Cohens).
13. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892) (explaining that the peace of the
Union might be threatened were not federal courts empowered to adjudicate
controversies between states and the federal government); see also United States v.
Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965) (reaffirming Texas).
14. See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904); Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838) (asserting jurisdiction over a border dispute
between two states).
15. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). Although the Supreme Court has not
explicitly retreated from Hall, the reasoning underlying the decision has been complicated
by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), and its progeny. Much of Hall's
rationale is based on the finding that the sovereign immunity of one State in another
State's courts has no constitutional dimension. The dissenters in Hall disagreed with the
majority on that point, a point emphatically made law by Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999). Compare Hall, 440 U.S. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I must agree with the
Court that if the judgment of the California Court of Appeal is to be reversed, a
constitutional source for Nevada's sovereign immunity must be found. I would find that
source not in an express provision of the Constitution but in a guarantee that is implied as
an essential component of federalism."); and id. at 439 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Art.
III and the Eleventh Amendment are built on important concepts of sovereignty that do
not find expression in the literal terms of those provisions, but which are of constitutional
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6

waived its immunity/ from suits against state officers for prospective
injunctive relief, 17 and (implicitly) from suits by any authorized party
18
under appropriate Spending Clause legislation.
No coherent theory of the applicable state sovereign immunity·
readily arises from this bizarre quagmire. Alexander Hamilton
famously, but rather incompletely, gave his explanation for the
applicability of state sovereign immunity: "Unless, therefore, there is
a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will
remain with the States." 19 The Court has long adopted this opaque
re f erence as a gm'd epost.20
dimension because their derogation would undermine the logic of the constitutional
scheme."), with Alden, 527 U.S. at 733 ("[T]he structure and history of the Constitution
make clear that the immunity exists today by constitutional design."). Moreover, a state's
supposed indignity of being forced to appear as a defendant, a rationale used by the court
to uphold immunity in federal courts, a state's own courts, and federal adjudicative
tribunals, see In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887); Alden, 527 U.S. at 748-49; Fed. Mar.
Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 759-60 (2002), would be no less profound
in a sister state's courts. The Court will have an opportunity to overrule or affirm Nevada
v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), this term in Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, No. 02-42
(U.S. 2002). Amici have urged the Court to topple Hall. See Amicus Brief of the States of
Fla., Alaska, Colo., Conn., Del., Haw., Ill., Ind., Me., Md., Mich., Miss., Mont., N.D., Ohio,
Utah, Vt., Va., W.Va., and the Commonwealth of P.R., 2002 WL 31863327 (Dec. 9, 2002).
16. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1887). Recently, the Court affirmed that the
state's voluntary removal of a case to federal court constituted a waiver of sovereign
immunity. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613 (2002).
17. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-160 (1908); see also Verizon Md., Inc. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635 (2002) (reaffirming Young).
18. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (affirming Congress' ability to
regulate, under the Spending Clause, matters expressly reserved to the states under the
Twenty-First Amendment); Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947)
(holding the Tenth Amendment no bar to Spending Clause legislation otherwise
unauthorized by Article I enumerated powers); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 755 (stating
that Congress has the authority and means to seek a state's voluntary consent to private
suits and citing Dole). Spending Clause "abrogation" is, according to the Court, more
accurately described as a state's voluntary waiver of its sovereign immunity in exchange
for some federal financial incentive. Of course, the spending power is not unlimited. If
the financial incentive is so great as to be coercive, i.e., when "pressure turns into
compulsion," Spending Clause legislation may not be valid. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937); accord College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,683 (1999).
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
20. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Alden, 527 U.S.
at 730-31; Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997); Blatchford v.
Native Viii. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 781 (1991); McKesson Corp. v. Fla. Alcohol &
Tobacco Div., 496 U.S. 18, 28-29 (1990); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19
(1989); Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 33, 40 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 99 (1984); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 440 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
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If Hamilton had explained a little more about what he meant by
that statement, perhaps it would not be difficult to distill a
recognizable rule. 21 Unfortunately, the historical record on state
sovereign immunity is remotely barren, and the Court's ad hoc
development of state sovereign immunity under Hamilton's aegis has
not fared well. 22 In Part II, I briefly recount the Court's state

662 n.9 (1974); Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep't of Pub. Health &
Welfare of Mo., 411 U.S. 279, 317 (1973); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S.
313, 322-23 (1934); South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 318 (1904); United
States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890); cf
Cohens v. Virgnia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 380 (1821) {Marshall, C.J.) ("And if a State has
surrendered any portion of its sovereignty, the question whether a liability to suit be a part
of this portion, depends on the instrument by which the surrender is made. If, upon a just
construction of that instrument, it shall appear that the State has submitted to be sued,
then it has parted with this sovereign right of judging in every case on the justice of its own
pretensions, and has entrusted that power to a tribunal in whose impartiality it confides.");
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. {2 Dall.) 419, 435 {1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) ("Every State
in the Union in every instance where its sovereignty has not been delegated to the United
States, I consider to be completely sovereign, as the United States are in respect to the
powers surrendered. The United States are sovereign as to all the powers of Government
actually surrendered: Each State in the Union is sovereign as to all the powers
reserved."). The Court skipped a beat with Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996), which only mentioned Hamilton's phrase in quoted passing. See Seminole Tribe,
517 U.S. at 68.
21. Justice Breyer has criticized reliance on the "plan of the convention" for its illdefined parameters. See Federal Mar., 535 U.S. 743, 772 {Breyer, J., dissenting)
("Considered purely as constitutional text, these words-constitutional design, system of
federalism, and plan of the convention-suffer several defects. Their language is highly
abstract, making them difficult to apply. They invite differing interpretations at least as
much as do the Constitution's own broad liberty-protecting phrases, such as due process of
law or the word liberty itself. And compared to these latter phrases, they suffer the
additional disadvantage that they do not actually appear anywhere in the Constitution.").
22. See, e.g., Susan Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of History, 81 NEB. L.
REV. 1, 2 (2002) ("The history of sovereign immunity in the United States is a history of
mistakes."); Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115
HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1652-53 & nn. 400-02 (2002) (citing scholarly criticism); Scott
Fruehwald, The Principled and Unprincipled Grounds of the New Federalism: A Call for
Detachment in the Constitutional Adjudication of Federalism, 53 MERCER L. REV. 811,
836-63 (2002) (criticizing the majority's state sovereign immunity jurisprudence as
"unprincipled"); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 859, 859-60 (2000) (noting two conflicting strains of justification for the
federalism doctrine); Ann Althouse, The Alden Trilogy: Still Searching for a Way to
Enforce Federalism, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 631, 647 (2000) (analyzing Alden and concluding
that the Court's federalism underpinnings to state sovereign immunity permit "the
national interest [to] win whenever we think it is important enough"); Daniel J. Meltzer,
State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1011, 1012 {2000); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 7.1 {3d ed. 1999)
(recording that the Court's Eleventh Amendment case law has been maligned as
"tortuous" and "hodgepodge"); Eric S. Johnson, Note, Unsheathing Alexander's Sword:
Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 51 AM. U. L. REV.
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sovereign immunity jurisprudence.
The next logical question, and one with which recent
commentary has toyed, 23 is: What are the parameters of state
sovereign immunity? The Court has made clear that certain
provisions of Article I contain no authority for overriding state
sovereign immunity, while at least one other provision, the
Fourteenth Amendment, permits Congress to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity. How is this constitutional line drawn? It is
temporally bound? 24 In other words, are only certain Amendments

1051, 1052 (2002) ("The conflicting, inconsistent, and contrived rationales delineating the
contours of this Eleventh Amendment Gordian knot often obscure rather than illuminate
the boundaries the Eleventh Amendment seeks to define."); see also Wis. Dep't of Corr. v.
Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 394 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing the state sovereign
immunity doctrine as a strange "hybrid"). But see William H. Pryor, Jr., Madison's
Double Security: In Defense of Federalism, the Separation of Powers, and the Rehnquist
Court, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1167, 1169 (2002) ("The jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court in
matters of federalism is principled, coherent, and true to the text and structure of the
Constitution.").
Professor Evan Caminker metaphorically describes the Supreme Court's vision of the
"plan of the convention" as anthropomorphic states sitting around a board room table,
with the United States as the chairman, trading sovereign immunities pursuant to some
major deal about to go through. See Evan H. Caminker, State Immunity Waivers for Suits
by the United States, 98 MICH. L. REV. 92, 113 (1999). Years ago, Chief Justice John
Marshall disavowed such a vision:
The assent of the States, in their sovereign capacity, is implied in calling a
convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the people. But the people
were at perfect liberty to accept or reject it; and their act was final. It required
not the affirmance, and could not be negatived, by the State governments ....
The government of the Union, then ... is, emphatically, and truly, a government
of the people.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,404-05 (1819). But see THE FEDERALIST
No. 39 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (suggesting that the assent was given
by state conventions with significant state presence). Patrick Henry made the same
observation, albeit in protestation: "[W]hat right had [the Framers] to say, We, the
People... . [W]ho authorised them to speak the language of We, the People, instead of
2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, FEDERALIST AND
We, the States?"
ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER
RATIFICATION 595, 596 (Bernard Bailyn ed. 1993) [hereinafter BAIL YN'S DEBATES).
23. A few scholars have briefly acknowledged the issue. See, e.g., Carlos Manuel
Vazquez, Treaties and the Eleventh Amendment, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 713, 726 n.69 (2002);
Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated
Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1259, 1260-61 (2001). Professor Susan Bandes, the one
scholar to directly address the issue, argues that state sovereign immunity could be a
clause-bound inquiry under the current Court majority's understanding. Susan Bandes,
Treaties, Sovereign Immunity, and "The Plan of the Convention," 42 VA. J. lNT'L L. 743,
747 (2002). As this article demonstrates, I reach a different conclusion.
24. The Court was clearly concerned with timing. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66
(citing Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 42 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Although courts following
Seminole Tribe have cited chronology as the justification for its holding, see, e.g.,
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enacted after the Eleventh Amendment free from absolute
subservience to state sovereign immunity? Or, does it divide the
original Constitution and its Amendments, meaning that state
sovereign immunity permeates the original Constitution but does not
infiltrate certain Amendments, even those ratified before the
Eleventh? Is state sovereign immunity article-bound, which would
prohibit Congress from subjecting the states to private suit under any
Article I power, but leave open the possibility that Article II or
Article IV might overcome immunity? Or perhaps it is clause-bound,
which would really provide no rule at all, and require a clause-byclause analysis of Hamilton's plan of the convention? Part III
answers that the state sovereign immunity envisioned by the Court is
an Amendment-driven inquiry: it is inviolable to the extent of the
original Constitution, and even such nationalistic powers as Congress'
Article I War Powers or the Treaty Power of Article II cater to it.
However, the Fourteenth Amendment changed the rules. Thus
certain Amendments may enable its abrogation, even those ratified
before the Eleventh Amendment if their precepts were incorporated
into the Fourteenth.

Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 391 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J.) (interpreting
Seminole Tribe to hold that the Commerce Power cannot limit Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity because it was ratified before the Eleventh Amendment), vacated on
other grounds, 165 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), the Court actually did not firmly
root its holding on those grounds.
The Seminole Tribe majority was likely quite wary of Justice Brennan's cogent observation
that timing was irrelevant if the principle behind the Eleventh Amendment was something
more ancient than the text of the Amendment itself. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 17-18
(criticizing Justice Scalia's dissent). Additional flaws weaken the timing argument. For
example, if the Fourteenth Amendment permits Congress to subject states to suit despite
the immunity found in the Eleventh Amendment simply because of chronology, it should
also permit Congress to authorize, as a means of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment,
cruel and unusual punishments otherwise unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
No one seriously takes this position. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, 573-74 (1990). Moreover, the
Fourteenth Amendment framers could not have intended to override states' immunity
under federal law because at the time the Eleventh Amendment had not been interpreted
to extend that far. See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign
Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 21. Finally, Seminole Tribe did not address the logical
corollary that the Fourteenth Amendment may also have altered the rest of the
Constitution in ways previously superceded by the Eleventh Amendment. See Jackson,
supra note 23 at 1259 (suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment could be read in
conjunction with the rest of the Constitution as promulgating a new federal-state balance
to the entire document).
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II. The Development of State Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity has enjoyed a firm place in history for many
25
centuries. The British heritage derived from the presumption that
the King could do no wrong26 and had supremacy over the judiciary.27
The American colonists, of course, dispensed with both justifications
when they declared their independence, rejected royalty, and
established a republic. 28 Nevertheless, in the matriculation from
colonies to states, the states became endowed with some form of that
sovereign right of immunity, either directly inherited from the crown,
By ratifying the
or bestowed by the liberated colonists.29
25. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414 (1979).
26. See id. at 415 n.7 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 246 ("The king,
moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong; he can never
mean to do an improper thing.")). It has been argued that this axiom originally meant that
the sovereign was not permitted to do wrong, rather than was not held accountable for acts
otherwise deemed wrongful. See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:
Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1963); David. E. Engdahl, Immunity and
Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 3 (1972).
Others have suggested that the phrase meant that the wrongful acts of the King's
subordinates would not be attributable to the King. Vazquez, supra note 23, at 866.
27. See Hall, 440 U.S. at 414-15 (explaining sovereign immunity on the basis that no
tribunal could be higher than the King).
28. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE <J]13 (U.S. 1776) ("The history of the
present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having
in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states."). In designing
the Constitution, the Framers adopted and discarded various English political and legal
postulates with a discriminating eye. See, e.g., Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137,
144 (1829) (Story, J.) ("The common law of England is not to be taken in all respects to be
that of America. Our ancestors brought with them its general principles, and claimed it as
their birthright; but they brought with them and adopted only that portion which was
applicable to their situation."); Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the
Doctrine, The Supreme Court 1999 Term, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 115 (2000) (explaining
that the Framers broke with English tradition in a variety of ways, including English
understanding of sovereignty). For a variety of reasons, the colonists' desire to depart
from many traditional English views had been simmering well before independence. See,
e.g., PAUL REINSCH, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY AMERICAN COLONIES 58
(1899). The current Court majority, however, has taken the position that the Framers did
not depart from traditional notions of state sovereign immunity. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 715-16 (1999) ("Although the American people had rejected other aspects of English
political theory, the doctrine that a sovereign could not be sued without its consent was
universal in the States when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.").
29. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 ("[T]he States' immunity from suit is a fundamental
aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the
Constitution, and which they retain today .... "). It is a debatable question whether the
states inherited sovereignty directly upon independence or whether the people first
inherited sovereignty and then ceded it to the states. For one famous case illustrating the
Court's struggle with this concept, see Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796). One
commentator has suggested that the states' immunity is not derived from English nations
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Constitution, however, the states agreed to its parameters and in the
process ceded much of their sovereign authority, including some of
the control over their sovereign immunity, to the new federal
government. 30
While it is clear that the states surrendered some of their
sovereign immunity in ratifying the Constitution, it is equally· clear
that the states did not cede all of their sovereign immunity. The
question which has entangled just about everyone confronting the
31
issue is which parts the states surrendered.
The question is framed by Article III of the Constitution, which
states, in part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall
be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;between a State and Citizens of another State;-between
Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
32
Citizens or Subjects.
Some Founders argued that this section, which extends the
judicial power to controversies "between a State and Citizens of
another State," permits certain private suits against states. 33 Others,
at all but is rather a novel American creation. See Alfred Hill, In Defense of Our Law of
Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REV. 485,489 (2001) ("[O]ur conception of the doctrine is
seriously skewed if we conceive of it as deriving from English law. We derived it
independently, in the same way as did England-and Italy and Japan.").
30. See Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. 397, 407 (1871)
(The Constitution ... was not framed merely to guard the States against danger
from abroad, but chiefly to secure union and harmony at home; and to
accomplish this end it was deemed necessary, when the Constitution was framed,
that many of the rights of sovereignty which the States then possessed should be
ceded to the General government; and that in the sphere of action assigned to it,
it should be supreme and strong enough to execute its own laws by its own
tribunals, without interruption from a State, or from State authorities.).
31. Cf Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 33 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("What is subject to greater dispute, however, is how much sovereign immunity was
implicitly eliminated by what Hamilton called the 'plan of the convention."').
32. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl.l.
33. See, e.g., 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 207 (J. Elliot ed., 1876) [hereinafter
ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (Edmund Randolph) ("I admire that part [of the Constitution] which
forces Virginia to pay her debts."); 3 id. at 491 (James Wilson) ("When a citizen has a
controversy with another state, there ought to be a tribunal where both parties may stand
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most notably Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John
Marshall, argued that Article III did not extend jurisdiction to suits
34
Whatever the original
brought against states by individuals.
on a just and equal footing."); 3 id. at 526-27 (George Mason) (maligning the Constitution
for enabling the "state to be brought to the bar of justice like a delinquent individual"); 3
id. at 543 (Patrick Henry) ("What says the paper? That it shall have cognizance of
controversies between a state and citizens of another state, without discriminating
between plaintiff and defendant."); 3 id. at 549 (Edmund Pendleton) ("The impossibility
of calling a sovereign state before the jurisdiction of another sovereign state, shows the
propriety and necessity of vesting this tribunal with the decision of controversies to which
a state shall be a party."); 3 id. at 566-67 (Grayson) ("My honorable friend, whom I much
respect, said that the consent of the parties must be previously obtained .... (I]t is not so
with our states. It is fixed in the Constitution that they shall become parties."); 3 id. at 573
(Edmund Randolph) ("I think ... that any doubt respecting the construction that a state
may be plaintiff, and not defendant, is taken away by the words where a state shall be a
party."); 3 id. at 637-38 (Tyler) ("No gentlemen here can give such a construction of
[Article III] as will give general satisfaction."); 4 id. at 205-06 (Lenoir) ("This state has
made a contract with its citizens. The public securities and certificates I allude to. These
may be negotiated to men who live in other states. Should that be the case, these
gentlemen will have demands against this state on that account."); 2 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 245 (Federal Farmer) (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (objecting that the
Consituttion enables suits against states); 2 id. at 245 (Federal Farmer) (presupposing that
a private individual could bring suit against a state); 2 id. at 429-31 (Brutus) ("[Article III]
is improper, because it subjects a state to answer in a court of law, to the suit of an
individual. This is humiliating and degrading to a government, and, what I believe, the
supreme authority of no state ever submitted to."); 1 BAILYN'S DEBATES, supra note 22,
at 673-74 (Agrippa) ("This power extends to all cases between a state and citizens of
another state. Hence a citizen, possessed of the notes of another state, may bring his
action .... "); J. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 157 (1961) (quoting a letter invoking the
fear that Article III would expose the states to suit by individual creditors); 14 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 72 (J.
Kaminski & G. Saladino eds., 1983) (contrasting the ability of the states to oppress their
own citizens without judicial redress but not diverse citizens); see also Randall, supra note
22, at 47 ("Apart from Madison and Marshall in the Virgina ratification debates, the
recorded comments of every other participant in the ratification debates-Federalist and
Antifederalist alike-show that they read the Constitution to extend the national judicial
power to cases brought against the states by diverse citizens.") (footnote omitted). The
New York Convention proposed the following amendment to Article III: "nothing in the
Constitution now under consideration contained is to be construed to authorize any suit to
be brought against any state, in any manner whatever." 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra, at
409. The Conventions of Virginia, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and New
Hampshire also proposed similar amendments. See William A. Fletcher, A Historical
Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction ofan Affirmative
Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV.
1033, 1051-52 (1983). None was adopted.
34. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) ("It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the
suit of an individual without its consent."); 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 33, at 555
(John Marshall) ("I hope that no gentleman will think that a state will be called at the bar
of the federal court . . . . It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power shall be
dragged before a court. The intent is, to enable states to recover claims of individuals
residing in other states."); 3 id. at 533 (James Madison) ("It is not in the power of
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meaning, if there was one at all,35 the language was adopted and
ratified.
The Court was quick to pick up the state sovereign immunity
debate. 36 In 1793, the Court decided Chisholm v. Georgia,37 a suit
under state common law brought by a citizen of South Carolina to
recover a debt against the State of Georgia. The suit clearly fell
within the literal language of that section of Article III, establishing
federal court jurisdiction over controversies between a state and
citizens of another state. 3M Nevertheless, Georgia argued that the
Court lacked jurisdiction over it as a sovereign state. 39
Justice James Iredell agreed. 40
Although conceding that
Congress could subject the states to suit under the express terms of

individuals to call any state into court. The only operation it can have is that, if a state
should wish to bring a suit against a citizen, it must be brought before the federal court.");
3 id. at 329 (New York Convention) ("[T]he judicial power of the United States, in cases
in which a state may be a party, does not ... authorize any suit by any person against a
state .... "); 3 id. at 336 (Rhode Island Convention) (same).
35. It is entirely possible that some states ratified believing Article III permitted suits
against them, while other states ratified trusting the statements of Madison, Marshall, and
Hamilton. After all, by the time Hamilton's statements in The Federalist were published
on January 9, 1788, five states-Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, and
Connecticut-had already ratified the Constitution.
Joan Meyler, A Matter of
Misinterpretation, State Sovereign Immunity, and Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence: The
Supreme Court's Reformation of the Constitution in Seminole Tribe and its Progeny, 45
HOW. L.J. 77, 86 n.33 (2001). By the time Madison spoke at the Virginia convention on
June 21, 1788, four more states-Massachusetts, Maryland, South Carolina, and New
Hampshire-had already ratified the Constitution. ld. Still other states may have ratified
the Constitution without ever coming to a definitive determination regarding the effect of
Article III on state sovereign immunity. See CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 27-40 (1972) (concluding that Pennsylvania,
Massachusetts, Virginia, New York, North Carolina and Rhode Island failed to reach a
definitive determination regarding whether state sovereign immunity survived Article III).
Indeed, at the Virginia Convention, Edmund Randolph stated: "It is said to be disgraceful
[to name a state as a defendant]. What would be the disgrace? Would it not be that
Virginia, after eight states had adopted the government, none of which opposed the
federal jurisdiction in this case, rejected it on this account?" 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 33, at 573 (Edmund Randolph). For more on the states' understandings of Article
III, see Randall, supra note 22, at 54-61.
36. Private suits against the states were filed during this time period in sufficient
numbers to suggest that a significant portion of the public believed-or, at least, hopedthat such suits were permitted by the Constitution. See 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 1-5 (Maeva Marcus et al.
eds., 1994) (noting that nine private suits against states were litigated in the 1790s).
37. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
38. See U.S. CONST. art. Ill,§ 2, cl. l.
39. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 419 (statement of Robert Forsyth).
40. See id. at 449 (Iredell, J ., dissenting).
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41

Article III, Justice Iredell concluded that Congress had not chosen
to do so with the Judiciary Act, the jurisdictional statute
implementing Article III, which limited jurisdiction to that "agreeable
42
to the principles and usages of law." Iredell thus found himself with
a case which turned, in his mind, on whether subjecting a state to
private suit was contemplated by that language in the Judiciary Act. 43
To determine whether suits against states were "agreeable to the
principles and usages of law," Iredell returned to "the principles of
the pre-existent laws, which must remain in force till superceded by
others," 44 also known as the common law, which controls in the
45
absence of legislation to the contrary. He recognized that English
common law directed that no remedy could be sought against the
46
sovereign, and, after an extensive analysis of the English common
law tradition of sovereign immunity, he inferred that the American
states inherited this relic. 47 For Iredell, state sovereign immunity was
alive and incorporated (or, at least, left unabridged) by the Judiciary
Act, and therefore Georgia was not amenable to suit. 48
In a final statement which he admitted to be dictum, 49 Iredell

41. See id. at 435-36 (Iredell, J., dissenting) ("[T]he general Government has a
Judicial Authority in regard to such subjects of controversy, and the Legislature of the
United States may pass all laws necessary to give such Judicial Authority its proper effect.
So far as States under the Constitution can be made legally liable to this authority, so far
to be sure they are subordinate to the authority of the United States, and their individual
sovereignty is in this respect limited.").
42. /d. at 434 (Iredell, J ., dissenting).
43. See id. at 449 (Iredell, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens has argued that Justice
Iredell essentially relied on statutory construction, rather than on constitutional
interpretation. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 78-81 (1996) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). His view joins unlikely bedfellows. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
491 U.S. 1, 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recognizing that "it was the statutory ground of
interpretation of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 80, rather than the
constitutional ground, that Justice Iredell had relied upon in his dissent in Chisholm").
44. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 437 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
45. See id. at 435 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (describing the common law as "a law which I
presume is the ground-work of the laws in every State in the Union, and which I consider,
so far as it is applicable to the Peculiar circumstances of the country, and where no special
act of Legislation controls it, to be in force in each State, as it existed in England,
(unaltered by any statute) at the time of the first settlement of the country").
46. See id. (Iredell, J., dissenting).
47. See id. at 437-49 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
48. See id. at 449 (Iredell, J., dissenting) ("My opinion being, that even if the
Constitution would admit of the exercise of such a power, a new law is necessary for the
purpose, since no part of the existing law applies, this alone is sufficient to justify my
determination in the present case.").
49. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 450 (Iredell, J., dissenting) ("This

732

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 29:4

commented:
[M)y present opinion is strongly against any construction of [the
Constitution), which will admit, under any circumstances, a
compulsive suit against a state for the recovery of money. I
think every word in the Constitution may have its full effect
without involving this consequence, and that nothing but
express words, or an insurmountable implication (neither of
which I consider, can be found in this case) would authorize the
deduction of so high a power. 5°
Justice Iredell's views did not prevail, at least not then. The other
four Justices found that both the Constitution and the Judiciary Act
established the Court's jurisdiction over Georgia despite the state's
claim of immunity. 51
The reaction to Chisholm, in the form of the Eleventh
Amendment, was swift and decisive. 52 Whereas Chisholm had held
opinion I hold, however, with all the reserve proper for one, which, according to my
sentiments in this case, may be deemed in some measure extra-judicial.").
50. /d. at 449-50 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
51. The Justices issued their opinions seriatim. Justice John Blair confined his
analysis to the Constitution, and, in accordance with the literal language of Article III, he
found jurisdiction. See id. at 450-51 (Blair, J.). Justice James Wilson, part of the fivemember committee that introduced the language of Article III into the Constitution,
echoed the extreme stance of popular sovereignty he espoused in the Pennsylvania
ratification debates: that the people, rather than the states, were the font of sovereignty.
See id. at 457 (Wilson, J.). That the people had exercised their sovereign prerogative to
subject their state governments to suit was, to Wilson, evident both from the clear text of
Article III and from the logical step that if the people could be hauled into court, then
entities of lesser sovereignty, such as the states, could as well. See id. at 465-66 (Wilson,
J.). Justice William Cushing reasoned that the Union's design, as a practical matter, was
most appropriately interpreted as withholding state sovereign immunity. See id. at 467-68
(Cushing, J.). Chief Justice John Jay delivered the final opinion in a synthesis of the
previous three concurrants. Like Wilson, Jay believed the Crown's sovereignty to pass to
the people, rather than to the colonies or the states, and that their amenability to suit
undermined state immunity from suit. And, like Cushing, Jay recognized that the design
of a federal government could be most effective when states were subservient to a
supreme national power. However, like Blair, he resorted to the text of the Constitution
to discern that sovereignty actually had been overcome. See id. at 470-77 (Jay, C.J.).
52. Proposals for overturning Chisholm were adopted within two days. See Nowak,
The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments
and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413,
1436-40 (1975). On January 2, 1794, almost a year later, the present version was
introduced. /d. It passed both Houses in spring of 1794 by an overwhelming majority. !d.
The states, surprisingly, were slow to act. The Amendment was not formally announced
as law until 1798. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE
FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-1801, at 196 (1997). By that time, two states had still not acted
on, and two others had flat-out rejected the Amendment. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 33, at 340-41. For a detailed look at the history of the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment, see John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign
Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1926-934 (1983).
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that the Court had jurisdiction over a common law suit against a state
brought by a citizen of another state, the Eleventh Amendment
established: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,
53
The Eleventh
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. "
54
Amendment not only neatly displaced Chisholm, but also prevented
Congress from returning to it. 55
Over the next hundred years, the issue of state sovereign
56
immunity trickled along. In 1890, in Hans v. Louisiana, the Supreme
Court considered the reach of the Eleventh Amendment in a case
brought by a citizen of the same state he was suing. 57 The Court
admitted that the Eleventh Amendment facially applies only to suits
brought by citizens of a different state. 58 Not a problem, explained
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
54. While there can be little doubt that the Eleventh Amendment was a direct
response to the Supreme Court's decision, the response does not mean that the Chisholm
majority misinterpreted the Constitution. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 33, at 1060-63;
Gibbons, supra note 52, at 1894. Nor does it mean that Justice Iredell got it right. I note
only that the Eleventh Amendment actually did "draft with a broader brush," Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 724 (1999), because it prohibited suits against states brought by
citizens of foreign states, an issue not at all raised by Chisholm. Had the drafters merely
intended to eliminate Chisholm, they would not have included the excess language in the
Eleventh Amendment. And if they nevertheless included excess language precluding suits
between foreign citizens and states, why did they not consider including other language
precluding suits between states and their own citizens? Surely it would have been easiest
to write "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted by any citizen against one of the United
States." Indeed, the day after Chisholm was announced, a resolution was introduced in
the House of Representatives which stated that "no State shall be liable to be made a
party defendant in any of the Judicial Courts established or to be established under the
authority of the United States, at the suit of any person or persons, citizens or foreigners,
or of any body politic or corporate whether within or without the United States." 1
CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 101 (1937).
This proposal was abandoned in favor of the present version.
55. After all, because Chisholm was at bottom a question of statutory construction,
Congress could have overturned the decision simply by amending the Judiciary Act of
1789. Instead, the decision was negated more pointedly by a constitutional amendment.
56. 134 u.s. 1 (1890).
57. !d. at 9 ("The question is presented, whether a State can be sued in a Circuit
Court of the United States by one of its own citizens upon a suggestion that the case is one
that arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States.").
58. !d. at 10 ("In the present case the plaintiff in error contends that he, being a
citizen of Louisiana, is not embarrassed by the obstacle of the Eleventh Amendment,
inasmuch as that amendment only prohibits suits against a State which are brought by
citizens of another State .... It is true, the amendment does so read [to permit the suit]
and if there were no other reason or ground for abating his suit, it might be
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the Court, because the Eleventh Amendment text is not the sole
consideration. 59 Citing Justice Iredell's dissent, the "startling and
60
unexpected . . . shock" of Chisholm, the comments of Hamilton,
61
Madison, and Marshall, the pre-Constitution tradition of sovereign
immunity, and the "anomaly" of prohibiting suit by an out-of-state

maintainable.").
59. See id. at 10-15.
60. !d. at 11. The Justices have quibbled over whether the decision in Chisholm
actually created such surprise. Compare Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 720-21 (1999)
(citing authorities), with Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 82 n.7 (1996)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (intimating that "the reaction to Chisholm reflected the popular
hostility to the Federal Judiciary more than any desire to restrain the National
Legislature"), and id. at 107 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that "there is ample
evidence contradicting the 'shock of surprise' thesis"). The question is one which may
never be resolved conclusively. Clearly, the decision met with. some hostility. Georgia
immediately passed a bill which decreed that any individual attempting to enforce a
judgment against the State would be "guilty of a felony and shall suffer death, without the
benefit of clergy, by being hanged." JACOBS, supra note 35, at 56-57. The Massachusetts
and Virginia legislatures called for a constitutional amendment. See Resolves of Mass. 28
(1793) (No. 45); Acts of Virginia 52 (1793). But ex post hostility does not necessarily
translate to surprise. Additionally, negative reactions were not universal; the Federalists
applauded the decision. See Gibbons, supra note 52, at 1926; Nowak, supra note 52, at
1433-36. The current majority continues to believe the theory. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v.
S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
61. See supra note 34. There is strong evidence that the statements of Hamilton,
Marshall, and Madison, when put into context, do not meet the unambiguous status to
which they have been elevated. See Mark Strasser, Chisholm, the Eleventh Amendment,
and Sovereign Immunity: On Alden's Return to Confederation Principles, 28 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 605, 634-45 (2001) (arguing that these luminaries would not have agreed with the
current Court's take on sovereign immunity); Gibbons, supra note 52, at 1905-14
(explaining the context of these statements). For example, Hamilton and Madison were
writing rejoinders to the anti-Federalist propaganda. Their primary goal was to persuade
and assuage (specifically. on the bitter New York battlefront) with their own Federalist
rhetoric, not necessarily to state their (or anyone else's) understanding. See, e.g., Randall,
supra note 22, at 14 ("Against the weight of evidence, Madison's, Hamilton's, and
Marshall's statements must be understood as part of the polemics of the ratification
process rather than as the prevailing interpretation of the founding generation."); Paul E.
McGreal, Saving Article I from Seminole Tribe: A View from The Federalist Papers, 55
SMU L. REV. 393, 401 n.50 (2002) (citing authorities); Gibbons, supra note 52, at 1906,
1912 n.ll2; see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 270 n.20 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Their fervent desire for ratification could have Jed them to
downplay the features of the new document that were arousing controversy."). Likewise,
if there were any doubt as to John Marshall's views on state sovereign immunity, even
after the Eleventh Amendment, they are clarified in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264 (1821). See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 382 ("[The judicial department] is
authorized to decide all cases of every description, arising under the constitution or Jaws of
the United States. From this general grant of jurisdiction, no exception is made of those
cases in which a State may be a party."); id. at 412 ("[I]n its origin, the judicial power was
extended to all cases arising under the constitution or Jaws of the United States, without
respect to parties.").
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citizen while permitting it to an in-state citizen, the Court held that a
state is immune from its own citizens' suits, notwithstanding the
textual limitations of the Eleventh Amendment.63 As the current
Court minority has pointed out, Hans queried only whether state
sovereign immunity controlled absent congressional intent to the
contrary. 64
Almost ninety years later,65 the Court confronted the question
not fully presented in Hans: can Congress affirmatively abrogate
state sovereign immunity? In 1976, the Court decided Fitzpatrick v.
66
Bitzer, a case involving Congress' attempt to abrogate state
sovereign immunity through Fourteenth Amendment legislation. 67
62. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890)
([W]e should have this anomalous result, that in cases ansmg under the
Constitution or laws of the United States, a State may be sued in the federal
courts by its own citizens, though it cannot be sued for a like cause of action by
the citizens of other States, or of a foreign state; and may be thus sued in the
federal courts, although not allowing itself to be sued in its own courts.).
63. See id. at 21. See Gibbons, supra note 52, at 1998-2002, for an insightf\11 political
explanation of the result in Hans.
64. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 84-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Hans instead
reflects, at the most, this Court's conclusion that, as a matter of federal common law,
federal courts should decline to entertain suits against unconsenting States. . . . Justice
Bradley explained that the State's immunity from suit by one of its own citizens was based
not on a constitutional rule but rather on the fact that Congress had not, by legislation,
attempted to overcome the common-law presumption of sovereign immunity."); id. at 11617 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The parties in Hans raised, and the Court in that case
answered, only what I have called the second question, that is, whether the Constitution,
without more, permits a State to plead sovereign immunity to bar the exercise of federalquestion jurisdiction . . . . [T]he Hans Court had no occasion to consider whether
Congress could abrogate that background immunity by statute."). Justice Stevens reads
Hans to rely principally upon congressional statute-Qr, rather, the lack of one-rather
than constitutional interpretation. !d. at 84-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He is, perhaps,
alone among the Justices in that belief. !d. at 119 n.15 (Souter, J., dissenting) (recognizing
support for Justice Stevens' view but declining to join it).
65. One case I omit in this review of the development of state sovereign immunity
jurisprudence is Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934), which held
federal courts without jurisdiction over a state-law suit by a foreign sovereign against a
state. Monaco, 292 U.S. at 317. Although there is much language in Monaco to support
state sovereign immunity, I do not view Monaco as adding much substance to the debate.
Monaco closely follows Hans, adopts its logic, quotes the same founding era statements,
and harps upon the same "shock of surprise" theory of Chisholm. See id. at 320-30.
66. 427 u.s. 445 (1976).
67. See id. at 447-48.
(In the 1972 Amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress,
acting under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, authorized federal courts to
award money damages in favor of a private individual against a state government
found to have subjected that person to employment discrimination [outlawed by
the statute]. The principal question presented by these cases is whether, as
against the shield of sovereign immunity afforded the State by the Eleventh
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The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment does provide
Congress the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity and to
68
subject the states to private suit.
The Court relied pointedly upon the Fourteenth Amendment,
noting that the Civil War Amendment "clearly contemplates
limitations on [the states'] authority," 69 and effectively created a new
"shift in the federal-state balance" of power. 70 This "expansion of
Congress' powers-with the corresponding diminution of state
sovereignty-" infuses Congress with an abrogation authority
71
"previously reserved to the States. " Thus, the Court held that the
Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign immunity are limited by
72
the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Fitzpatrick determined that state sovereign immunity could be
trumped by Congress acting pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
What other parts of the Constitution authorized such a power? In
73
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., a plurality of the Court reasoned
74
that the Interstate Commerce Clause also permitted Congress to
eliminate state sovereign immunity because the states surrendered
sovereignty with respect to interstate commerce when they ceded to
Congress plenary power to regulate ies
Although admitting that its conclusion was novel, the plurality
began by following several prior cases marking a "trail" leading to its
76
The plurality reasoned that,
conclusion, including Fitzpatrick.
"[l]ike the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause with one
hand gives power to Congress while, with the other, it takes power
away from the states."77 Importantly, for the plurality, it was the
Amendment . . . Congress has the power to authorize federal courts to enter
such an award against the State as a means of enforcing the substantive
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.).
68. !d. at 456.
69. !d. at 453.
70. !d. at 455.
71. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976).
72. !d. at 456.
73. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power "to regulate
Commerce ... among the several States").
75. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,16-17 (1989).
76. See id. at 14 ("Though we have never squarely resolved this issue of congressional
power, our decisions mark a trail unmistakably leading to the conclusion that Congress
may permit suits against the States for money damages.").
77. !d. at 16; accord id. at 17.
(The important point, rather, is that the provision both expands federal power
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simultaneous cessation of regulatory power from the states and
corresponding grant to the federal government that implicated a
78
surrender of abrogation authority to the national government.
Accordingly, the plurality had little difficulty finding that the states
surrendered their sovereign immunity to Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause. 79 Justice White, whose concurrence provided the
fifth vote, added cryptically that while he concurred in the result, he
80
did "not agree with much of [the plurality's] reasoning."
Seven years and several changes in the Court's membership later,
the Court overruled Union Gas in Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida. 81 There, the Seminole Indian Tribe sued the State of Florida
under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, a statute enacted pursuant
to the Indian Commerce Clause82 which authorized an Indian tribe to
bring a cause of action against a state for breach of the state's duty to
negotiate with Indian tribes in good faith. 83
The Court began by citing the Eleventh Amendment and stating
that the Amendment has long stood for a meaning beyond its literal
text. 84 That meaning, explained the Court, was that unconsenting
states, by virtue of their sovereignty, are not amenable to suit by
private individuals. 85 This position was not remarkable. A host of
prior Court decisions had recognized substantive meaning beyond the
and contracts state power; that is the meaning, in fact, of a 'plenary' grant of
authority, and the lower courts have rightly concluded that it makes no sense to
conceive of§ 5 as somehow being an 'ultraplenary' grant of authority.).
78. See id. at 19-20.
(Because the Commerce Clause withholds power from the States at the same
time as it confers it on Congress, and because the congressional power thus
conferred would be incomplete without the authority to render States liable in
damages, it must be that, to the extent that the States gave Congress the
authority to regulate commerce, they also relinquished their immunity where
Congress found it necessary, in exercising this authority, to render them liable.).
79. See id. at 20.
80. /d. at 57 {White, J., concurring & dissenting).
81. 517 u.s. 44 (1996).
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power "to regulate
Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes").
83. 25 u.s.c. § 2710{d) {1996).
84. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 ("Although the text of the Amendment would
appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, 'we have
understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the
presupposition ... which it confirms."') (quoting Blatchford v. Native Viii. of Noatak, 501
U.S. 775, 779 (1991) {ellipsis in Seminole Tribe)).
85. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 ("[F]ederal jurisdiction over suits against
unconsenting States 'was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the
judicial power of the United States."') (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 {1890)).
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Seminole Tribe merely reiterated that

86. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Viii. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) ("[W]e
have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for
the presupposition ... which it confirms."); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 238 (1985) ("As we have recognized, the significance of this Amendment 'lies in its
affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of
judicial authority in Art. III' of the Constitution.") (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984)); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974)
("While the Amendment by its terms does not bar suits against a State by its own citizens,
this Court has consistently held that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought
in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State."); Employees
of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare of Mo. v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare of Mo.,
411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973) ("Although the Eleventh Amendment is not literally applicable
since petitioners who brought suit, are citizens of Missouri, it is established that an
unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as
well as by citizens of another State."); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,
322 (1934) ("Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the words of§ 2
of Article III, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the
restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States. Behind the words of the
constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control."); In re N.Y., 256 U.S.
490, 497 (1921) ("[I]t has become established by repeated decisions of this court that the
entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain
a suit brought by private parties against a State without consent given: not one brought by
citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State, because of the
Eleventh Amendment; and not even one brought by its own citizens, because of the
fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification."); In re Ayers, 123
U.S. 443, 505-06 (1887) ("To secure the manifest purposes of the constitutional exemption
guarantied by the [eleventh] amendment requires that it should be interpreted, not
literally and too narrowly, but fairly, and with such breadth and largeness as effectually to
accomplish the substance of its purpose.").
The Court has continued to cling steadfastly to a breadth of the Eleventh Amendment
distended from its text. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753
(2002) ("As a result, the Eleventh Amendment does not define the scope of the States'
sovereign immunity; it is but one particular exemplification of that immunity."); Bd. of
Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) ("Although by its terms the
Amendment applies only to suits against a State by citizens of another State, our cases
have extended the Amendment's applicability to suits by citizens against their own
States."); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) ("[W]e have made clear that
the Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting
States."); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 736 (1999) ("[T]he ... text of the Amendment is
not an exhaustive description of the States' constitutional immunity from suit."); Coli. Sav.
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 669 (1999)
("Though its precise terms bar only federal jurisdiction over suits brought against one
State by citizens of another State or foreign state, we have long recognized that the
Eleventh Amendment accomplished must more: It repudiated the central premise ... that
the jurisdictional heads of Article III superseded the sovereign immunity that the States
possessed before entering the Union."); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd. v. Coli. Sav.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627,634-35 (1999) (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54); Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997) ("The Court's recognition of sovereign
immunity has not been limited to the suits described in the text of the Eleventh
Amendment.").
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extra-textual proposition87 and established that, at least in the absence
of congressional abrogation, Florida was immune from the suit. 88
The Court then turned to whether Congress had validly
abrogated that immunity. 89 Of course, Union Gas, which held that
Congress could abrogate pursuant to the Interstate Commerce
Clause, almost squarely answered that question, especially on Justice
Brennan's broad reasoning.
But the Seminole Tribe Court
reconsidered Union Gas. Holding that Union Gas's reasoning was
fully supported by only a minority of Justices,90 "deviated sharply
from our established federalism jurisprudence and essentially
eviscerated our decision in Hans," 91 and relied on cases which were
off-point,92 the Court overruled it. The Court concluded:
In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the
background principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in
the Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate
when the subject of the suit is an area, like the regulation of
Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive control of the
Federal Government.93
94
Three years later, in Alden v. Maine, the Court considered
whether Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity in state
court. Here, the majority Justices confronted a perplexing twist on
the Eleventh Amendment. If, as Seminole Tribe recited, the Eleventh
Amendment stood as the nontextual font of the elusive principle of
state sovereign immunity, the majority was in a bind when it came to
state courts because the Eleventh Amendment clearly speaks only to
a limitation of federal court jurisdiction.95
87. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 n.7 (1996) (citing cases).
88. /d. at 55-56.
89. Id at 58.
90. /d. at 63-64, 66.
91. /d. at 64.
92. /d. at 65-66 (criticizing the Union Gas plurality for relying on waiver cases and
Fitzpatrick).
93. Id. at 72.
94. 527 u.s. 706 (1999).
95. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.") (emphasis added); see also Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 204-05
(1991) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not apply in state courts.") (quoting Will v.
Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1989)). All nine Justices in Alden
recognized this obvious quandary. Alden, 527 U.S. at 730; id. at 760 (Souter, J., dissenting)
("[T]he Court of course confronts the fact that the state forum renders the Eleventh
Amendment beside the point .... ").
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To reach the decision that Congress lacked authority to abrogate
state sovereign immunity in state courts, the Supreme Court promptly
96
distanced state sovereign immunity from the Eleventh Amendment.
Rather than confining the principle to that provision, Alden found
state sovereign immunity incorporated between the Constitution's
lines of text as part of the essence of federalism. 97
Such a holding required that the state sovereign immunity
principle was a part of the original Constitution, misinterpreted by
Chisholm and restored by the Eleventh Amendment. The Court first
viewed pre-ratification historical evidence indicating that the States
universally recognized sovereign immunity98 and comments by the
Framers advocating the retention of state sovereign immunity in
99
general. Turning to post-ratification evidence, the Court cited the
Eleventh Amendment's overruling of Chisholm as evidence that the
fledgling nation considered state sovereign immunity to be left
relatively undisturbed by the Constitution's text. 100
Concluding that the historical evidence amply supported its
conclusion that the original meaning of the Constitution did not
extend judicial power to suits against states, the Court next examined
its prior decisions. Citing the plethora of cases discerning immunity
outside the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court
interpreted the amalgam to stand for the idea that state sovereign
immunity was captured in the whole of the Constitution, not merely
the Eleventh Amendment. 101 State sovereign immunity "inheres,"

96. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 ("We have, as a result, sometimes referred to the States'
immunity from suit as 'Eleventh Amendment immunity.' The phrase is convenient
shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity of the States neither
derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment."); cf id. at 761
(Souter, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, if the Court's current reasoning is correct, the Eleventh
Amendment itself was unnecessary."); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 95 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("The fundamental error that continues to lead the Court astray is its failure to
acknowledge that its modern embodiment of the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity
has absolutely nothing to do with the limit on judicial power contained in the Eleventh
Amendment.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Alden, 527 U.S. at 730 ("This separate and distinct structural principle is not
directly related to the scope of the judicial power established by Article III, but inheres in
the system of federalism established by the Constitution.").
98. /d. at 715-16 ("Although the American people had rejected other aspects of
English political theory, the doctrine that a sovereign could not be sued without its
consent was universal in the States when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.").
99. /d. at 716-19 (reviewing the writings of Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall).
100. /d. at 720-27 (suggesting that the Eleventh Amendment meant to restore, rather
than alter, the original meaning of the Constitution).
101. /d. at 728 ("These holdings reflect a settled doctrinal understanding, consistent
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according to the Court, in the "structure" of the Constitution, and the
mere fact that the Eleventh Amendment only speaks to federal court
jurisdiction does not mean that the states have any less immunity in
state courts. 102 To the contrary, Alden found no state surrender of
sovereign immunity in the "plan of the Convention" with respect to
federal claims in state courts. 103
The Court buttressed its historical findings with principles of
normative concerns: the respect for the dignity of states as
sovereigns,'04 the alignment of state sovereignty with federal
sovereignty in some semblance of symmetrical sovereignty, 105 the
fiscal concern of burdening state treasuries with a few private, but
massive, judgments,106 the republican concern of disrupting local
governance, 107 the hesitancy to create anomalies, such as state
immunity in federal court but not in their own courts,108 and the
with the views of the leading advocates of the Constitution's ratification, that sovereign
immunity derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the
original Constitution itself.").
102. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730-31 (1999); accord id. at 733-34 ("[T]he structure
and history of the Constitution make clear that the immunity exists today by constitutional
design."). The Court distinguished Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), which held that
states can be privately sued in other states' courts, as not speaking to the issue of whether
states could be hailed into their own courts. Hall, 440 U.S. at 738-40. A sovereign's
amenability to suit in another's courts, Alden expounded, is a matter of comity, while a
sovereign's amenability to suit in its own courts is solely within the province of the
sovereign. Alden, 527 U.S. at 749; accord Hall, 440 U.S. at 416 ("[A] claim of immunity in
another sovereign's courts ... necessarily implicates the power and authority of a second
sovereign; its source must be found either in an agreement, express or implied, between
the two sovereigns, or in the voluntary decision of the second to respect the dignity of the
first as a matter of comity.").
103. Alden, 527 U.S. at 760. The investigation turned up silence, which, the Court
inferred, meant that the states had no intention of surrendering their immunity in their
own courts. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 741 ("[T]he silence is most instructive. It suggests the
sovereign's right to assert immunity from suit in its own courts was a principle so well
established that no one conceived it would be altered by the new Constitution."). Silence
also is consistent with at least two other logical possibilities: that everyone plainly
understood the states to surrender immunity or that no one really considered the issue.
Nevertheless, by making silence dispositive, the opponents of abrogation have dealt it a
heavy blow.
104. /d. at 749-50.
105. /d.
(It is unquestioned that the Federal Government retains its own immunity from
suit not only in state tribunals but also in its own courts. In light of our
constitutional system recognizing the essential sovereignty of the States, we are
reluctant to conclude that the States are not entitled to a reciprocal privilege.).
106. /d. at 750.
107. /d. at 751.
108. Alden, 527 U.S. at 752-53.
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practical reality that other means of assuring state compliance exist.
As these cases demonstrate, the Court has not been hesitant to
answer new state sovereign immunity questions in the last few years,
and the correctness of its answers has been the subject of heated
debate among commentators and the Court itself. The debate is
saturated on both sides, and I need not enter the fray here. Instead, I
seek the rule of law. Accepting that state sovereign immunity is a
constitutional right which was only surrendered by the states pursuant
to the plan of the convention (as the Court has), where does their
sovereign immunity end and the government's power to abrogate
begin? With this backdrop, I turn now to the task of discerning the
boundaries of the current state sovereign immunity doctrine.

III. The Boundaries of State Sovereign Immunity
So where does state sovereign immunity yield to the federal
government's power to abrogate?
I believe that the Court
understands state sovereign immunity to trump all federal powers
granted by the original Constitution. Though obscure on this point,
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida 110 is best read to stand for the
proposition that Congress has no power under Article I to abrogate
state sovereign immunity. Seminole Tribe and other sovereign
immunity cases also strongly suggest that the federal government has
no power under any other provision in the original Constitution to
abrogate state sovereign immunity.
However, the Fourteenth
Amendment clearly does provide Congress a limited abrogation
power.
Amendments enacted subsequent to the Fourteenth
Amendment are built upon the federal-state shift the Civil War
Amendments created and, therefore, may also provide abrogation
power.
Additionally, because the Fourteenth Amendment
retroactively incorporated most of the rights protected by the Bill of
Rights, it is best understood as permitting abrogation under certain
Amendments predating the Eleventh Amendment. In other words,
state immunity is inviolable with respect to the original Constitution
but may be susceptible to abrogation under its Amendments. State
sovereign immunity, therefore, is not a clause-driven, but rather an
amendment-driven, inquiry. 111
109. See id. at 755.
llO. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
111. As support for the contrary view, Professor Bandes states: "The notion of a
generally applicable sovereign immunity doctrine is at odds with the current doctrinal
understanding, which is highly clause-bound." Bandes, supra note 23, at 745. For this
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A. Article I

Seminole Tribe, perhaps the preeminent decision defining the
contours of state sovereign immunity, strongly supports the view that
state sovereign immunity trumps all Article I powers. 112 The case
involved a suit against the State of Florida brought under Indian
Commerce Clause legislation. The Court noted that the only other
time it had recognized Congress' power to abrogate pursuant to an
Article I power was Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 113 which found
abrogation power in the Interstate Commerce Clause. Seminole
Tribe characterized Union Gas as follows: "We think it clear that
Justice Brennan's opinion finds Congress' power to abrogate under
the Interstate Commerce Clause from the states' cession of their
sovereignty when they gave Congress plenary power to regulate
interstate commerce." 114 According to Seminole Tribe, Union Gas
reasoned that the surrender of plenary regulatory authority to
Congress also necessitated the surrender of abrogation authority to
Congress. 115 Because Congress has at least the same plenary power (if
not more) to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, Union· Gas, if

propositiOn, she cites a recent article authored by Professor Vicki Jackson, Holistic
Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1259
(2001). Under my reading, Professor Jackson actually argues quite the opposite: "In its
recent decisions, the Court's analysis of the constitutional scope of federal powers has
been particularly 'clause-bound,' while its analysis of state immunities has focused on a
more holistic appreciation of the structure and relationship of different parts of the
Constitution to each other." Jackson, supra note 23, at 1260-61. Professor Bandes also
suggests that the Ex parte Young doctrine has been applied "in an increasingly clausebound manner." Bandes, supra note 23, at 751. However, this "clause-bound manner"
has developed only between Article I powers and the Fourteenth Amendment, the same
parameters of state sovereign immunity in general. See id. at 751 n.46 (comparing Indian
Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment cases).
112. In my own view, Seminole Tribe at best is an extremely weak opinion and at
worst, a deeply flawed one. Based solely on the opinion itself, I would consider anything
other than its narrowest holding to be an open question. Nevertheless, when read in light
of Union Gas and subsequent cases, I believe its broader intent is clear.
113. 491 u.s. 1 (1989).
114. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 61.
115. See id. at 62 ("Indeed, it was in those circumstances where Congress exercised
complete authority that Justice Brennan thought the power to abrogate most necessary.").
This is a fair characterization of the plurality's reasoning. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 1920 ("Because the Commerce Clause withholds power from the States at the same time as
it confers it on Congress, and because the congressional power thus conferred would be
incomplete without the authority to render States liable in damages, it must be that, to the
extent that the States gave Congress the authority to regulate commerce, they also
relinquished their immunity where Congress found it necessary, in exercising this
authority, to render them liable.").
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correctly decided, directed that Florida lose. 116
The Court, however, overruled Union Gas. 117 The Court went
out of its way to expressly state its rejection of the reasoning of Union
Gas, as well as its holding. 118 In other words, the states' cession of
"complete law-making authority over a particular area" does not
necessarily require their cession of abrogation authority as well. 119
The Court concluded: "In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm
that the background principle of state sovereign immunity embodied
in the Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when
the subject of the suit is an area, like the regulation of Indian
commerce, that is under the exclusive control of the Federal
120
Government. "
Importantly, Seminole Tribe makes sense only if it actually holds
that Congress has no power under Article I to subject the states to
private suit. Seminole Tribe repudiated Union Gas's reasoning that
abrogation power follows plenary regulatory power, and, having done
so, the Court need not have overruled the Union Gas holding. 121
Deprived of its reasoning, Union Gas no longer directed the result in
Seminole Tribe. The Court could have just as easily left the Interstate
Commerce Clause power open for another day and focused instead
on a clause-specific analysis of whether Hamilton's plan of the
convention contemplated congressional abrogation of state sovereign
immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause.
The Court did not engage in such a clause-specific inquiry,
116. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62-63 (1996).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 89-93.
118. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66-67 (focusing specifically on the Union Gas
reasoning).
119. !d. at 72.
120. !d.
121. See id. at 66-67. Indeed, a strong case can be made that Seminole Tribe was
merely setting up the Union Gas plurality's reasoning as a straw man. Under Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds." Marks, 430 U.S. at 193. Because Justice White
agreed with the result in Union Gas but not the expansive reasoning of the plurality, his
concurrence is the narrowest rationale. Under Marks, Seminole Tribe should have read
Union Gas for its narrowest holding, Justice White's, and disregarded the plurality's
rationale for the result. That narrow holding was simply that Congress could abrogate
state sovereign immunity under the Commerce Clause. Thus, because Seminole Tribe did
not involve the Commerce Clause (and, indeed, specifically recognized the differences
between the Commerce Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause), it was not bound by,
and need not have reconsidered, Union Gas.
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however. Rather, the Court overruled Union Gas and engaged in
very little clause-specific analysis of the Indian Commerce Clause,
except to affirm that the states' cession of plenary regulatory
authority is irrelevant. The only way to achieve this result was for the
Court to rely on a similarly broad rule applying to both the Indian
Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause.
This is exactly what Seminole Tribe did, by implicitly extending
state sovereign immunity at least to the reaches of Article I. I say
"implicitly" because the Court's precise reasoning (if not its intent) is
difficult to fathom; however, three reasons convince me that Seminole
Tribe did establish this rule. First, the opinion reads extremely
broadly and its scope appears to encompass all of Article I: "The
Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III,
and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional
limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction." 122 Second, such a rule
was necessary to justify both overruling Union Gas's holding and
dictating the result in Seminole Tribe, especially without any in-depth
discussion of the two Clauses at issue. Finally, both the dissent and a
host of subsequent decisions have recognized Seminole Tribe as
standing for the proposition that Article I cannot be used to abrogate
state sovereign immunity. 123 For these reasons Seminole Tribe and its
122. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,72-73 (1996).
123. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 749-50 (2002)
(stating that in Seminole Tribe "we held that Congress, pursuant to its Article I powers,
cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity"); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001) ("Congress may not, of course, base its abrogation of the States'
Eleventh Amendment immunity upon the powers enumerated in Article I."); Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80 (2000) ("In Seminole Tribe, we held that Congress lacks
power under Article I to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity."); Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 712 (1999) ("[Seminole Tribe] made it clear that Congress lacks power under
Article I to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suits commenced or prosecuted
in the federal courts."); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coli. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 636 (1999) ("Seminole Tribe makes clear that Congress may not abrogate
state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers; hence the Patent Remedy Act
cannot be sustained under either the Commerce Clause or the Patent Clause."); see also
Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2001); Reickenbacker v. Foster,
No. 00-31121 (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 2001) (citing Seminole Tribe for the proposition that "[I]t is
now settled that Congress may not act to abrogate state sovereign immunity through any
of its Article I enumerated powers"); Yselta del Sur Pueblo v. Laney, 199 F.3d 281, 288
(5th Cir. 2000); In re Sacred Heart Hasp. of Norristown, 133 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 1998)
("The Seminole Tribe Court held that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign
immunity by legislation passed pursuant to its Article I powers."); Velasquez v. Frapwell,
160 F.3d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J.), vacated on other grounds, 165 F.3d 593
(7th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Close v. New York, 125 F.3d 31, 38 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1997)
(citing cases); cf Pennyslvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 40 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("If private suits against States, though not permitted under Article III (by
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progeny provide strong evidence that Article I abrogation questions
are not deemed to be clause-bound under current state sovereign
immunity jurisprudence.
Recently, a Sixth Circuit panel in In re Hood 124 held, in conflict
with five other Courts of Appeals, 125 that the Bankruptcy Clause of
Article I provides Congress with the power to abrogate state
126
sovereign immunity. The text of the Bankruptcy Clause provides
that Congress may "establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States." 127 Hood suggested that
the term "uniform" necessarily contemplates a surrender of state
sovereign immunity pursuant to the plan of the convention. Hood
reasoned that the states necessarily ceded regulatory power under the
Bankruptcy Clause because "[g)ranting the federal government the
power to make uniform laws is, at least to some extent, inconsistent
with states retaining the power to make laws over that issue."' 28
Regardless of the import of the term 'uniform,' it cannot, under
Seminole Tribe and its progeny, necessarily equate to the surrender of
state sovereign immunity. The term cannot mean that all parties to a
bankruptcy proceeding must be treated equally. Rather, the term
most plausibly applies only to conflicting codes and procedures. In
other words, the importance is structural uniformity, rather than
party equality. In such a case, a state's assertion of immunity does
nothing to destroy "uniformity," since the bankruptcy laws, including
the exception for state sovereign immunity, would be the same in
virtue of the understanding represented by the Eleventh Amendment), are nonetheless
permitted under the Commerce Clause, or under some other Article I grant of federal
power, then there is no reason why the other limitations of Article III cannot be similarly
exceeded. That Article would be transformed from a comprehensive description of the
permissible scope of federal judicial authority to a mere default disposition, applicable
unless and until Congress prescribes more expansive authority in the exercise of one of its
Article I powers. That is not the regime the Constitution establishes."). But see DiazGandia v. Dapena-Thompson, 90 F.3d 609, 616 n.9 (1st Cir. 1996) (proclaiming, without
explanation, that Seminole Tribe "does not control the War Powers analysis").
124. 319 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. Feb. 3,.2003).
125. See In re Nelson, 301 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Mitchell, 209 F.3d 1111 (9th
Cir. 2000); In re Fernandez, 123 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1997), amended by In re Fernandez, 130
F.3d 1138 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Creative Goldsmiths of Wash., D.C., 119 F.3d 1140 (4th
Cir. 1997).
126. See Hood, 319 F.3d at 758 ("[W]e conclude that Article I, section 8 of the
Constitution gives Congress the power to abrogate states' sovereign immunity.").
127. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 4.
128. Hood, 319 F.3d at 763; accord id. at 764 ("In order for laws to be uniform, the
laws must be the same everywhere. That uniformity would be unattainable if states could
pass their own laws.").
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every case.
At most, the term means that the power to pass bankruptcy laws
129
resides exclusively in the federal government.
Hood adopts this
interpretation130 and relies on The Federalist No. 32 as support for the
conclusion that where federal power is exclusive, the states waived
their sovereign immunity. 13 ' But Seminole Tribe pointedly disavowed
that exclusive regulatory power does not necessarily include an
abrogation power. 132 Justice Stevens warned that the reasoning of
Seminole Tribe would apply equally to the Patent Clause and the
Bankruptcy Clause. 133 The majority was nonplussed. 134 Justice Souter,
129. The Court has, however, early on eschewed this interpretation. See Sturges v.
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122,193-96 (1819) (holding that the Bankruptcy Clause
prohibited state regulation only where Congress had already acted).
130. See Hood, 319 F.3d at 764 ("As it was initially understood, the Bankruptcy Clause
represented the states' total grant of their power to legislate on bankruptcy.").
131. See id. at 765 ("The Federalist suggests that the states shed their immunity from
suit along with their power to legislate together when the states agreed to the Bankruptcy
Clause's uniformity provision."). Hood recognizes that the power to legislate may be
divorced from the power to abrogate. See id. at 765 ("Of course, it is possible that in
ceding some sovereignty with the Bankruptcy Clause, the states ceded their legislative
powers but not their immunity from suit . . . . This could suggest that the power to
legislate and the immunity from suit were distinct aspects of sovereignty in the early
Americans' minds, and that the decision to cede one aspect to the federal government
does not by itself imply a surrender of the other.").
132. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62-63, 72-73 (1996).
(Under the rationale of Union Gas, if the States' partial cession of authority over
a particular area includes cession of the immunity from suit, then their virtually
total cession of authority over a different area must also include cession of the
immunity from suit. . . . We agree with petitioner that the plurality opinion in
Union Gas allows no principled distinction in favor of the States to be drawn
between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause ....
In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the background principle of
state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not so
ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area, like the
regulation of Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive control of the Federal
Government. Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents
congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting
States. The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III,
and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed
upon federal jurisdiction. Petitioner's suit against the State of Florida must be
dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction.).
133. See id. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Rather, it prevents Congress from
providing a federal forum for a broad range of actions against States, from those sounding
in copyright and patent law, to those concerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and the
regulation of our vast national economy."); id. at 93-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In
confronting the question whether a federal grant of jurisdiction is within the scope of
Article III, as limited by the Eleventh Amendment, I see no reason to distinguish among
statutes enacted pursuant to the power granted to Congress to regulate commerce among
the several States, and with the Indian tribes, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, the power to establish
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in dissent, presented the same Federalist No. 32 argument as Hood, 135
but his words fell on deaf ears-the majority did not even deign to
respond, choosing instead to rely on the sweeping statements of
precedent. 136 Hood is, I believe, in irreconcilable conflict with
Seminole Tribe.
I am more sympathetic to the argument that some Article I
clauses, such as the War Powers Clauses, might provide abrogation
authority because of their extreme federal slant. 137 The nation's need
to act quickly and without internal resistance in military matters is
extremely important. 138 Finally, federalism concerns are arguably
weaker in the War Powers context. 139 Thus, in the area of foreign
uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy, Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, the power to promote the
progress of science and the arts by granting exclusive rights to authors and inventors, Art.
I, § 8, cl. 8, the power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, § 5, or
indeed any other provision of the Constitution.").
134. See id. at 72 n.16 (stating that "it has not been widely thought that the federal
antitrust, bankruptcy, or copyright statutes abrogated the States' sovereign immunity" and
arguing that the efficacy of these statutes do not necessitate suits against states).
135. See id. at 143 n.39 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("As I explain further below, the views
of Madison and his allies on this more difficult question can be divined, if at all, only by
reference to the more extended discussions by Hamilton in The Federalist No. 32, and by
Justice Iredell in his Chisholm dissent. Both those discussions, I submit, tend to support a
congressional power of abrogation."); id. at 145-49 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that
The Federalist No. 32 supports an abrogation power when the federal government has
exclusive regulatory control over a particular subject).
136. See id. at 68-71.
137. The U.S. government has taken this stance in several War Powers cases. See
Vazquez, supra note 23, at 726 n.66 (citing briefs of the U.S. Attorney in various cases).
138. An America on the brink of war could little benefit from a "cacophony of
conflicting policies," Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The
Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 344
(1999), insisted upon by various state positions. State resistance to national military and
international policies could undermine the security of the nation as a whole. At the very
least, state resistance could embarrass the national government. See Richard B. Bilder,
The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 821, 827-28 (1989).
Such conflict between the states and the national government was a principal impetus for
replacing the Articles of Confederation.
139. In addition to serious detriments of state resistance to congressional War Powers
legislation, the primary benefits justifying federalism are weakened in the context of the
War Powers. One commonly invoked justification for federalism is that the states provide
independent training grounds for novel governmental matters. See Barry Friedman,
Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 397 (1997). In the context of military and
international affairs, any "testing" would be virtually nonexistent because war falls in the
exclusive province of the national government. A second justification for federalism, local
expertise, see id. at 401-02; cf United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581-83 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring), is similarly inapplicable. States usually have less expertise than
the federal government in international matters, both because the issues may involve
mattefSihaving very little to do with the state and because the states have traditionally
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affairs, national uniformity is paramount, and one could argue
persuasively that the ability of the states to resist federal coercion
should diminish with respect to Congress' War Powers.
Indeed, the majority in Seminole Tribe recognized that not all
Article I clauses are alike in their federal character when it
distinguished between the Interstate Commerce Clause and the
140
Indian Commerce Clause. Implicitly, Seminole Tribe momentarily
opened the door to the possibility that if an Article I clause had
sufficient federal chutzpah, it might authorize abrogation of state
sovereign immunity. However, Seminole Tribe did not go down that
path. The Court refused to take a clause-specific approach, favoring
instead wholesale line-drawing. 141
In any case, I find it most unlikely that the current Court would
find a War Powers exception, even if the Court made the inquiry. In
addition to the arguments I make in the following Subpart, there are
two reasons why there is no room in the current majority's
understanding for a War Powers exception. First, the War Powers
Clause's preeminent federal nature does not approach the dramatic
shift in federal-state power effectuated by the Fourteenth
Amendment, the one constitutional provision which the Court has
identified as sufficiently federal to encompass an abrogation power.
Second, the Court has long held that not even the War Powers
Clause, at least in times of peace, 142 can override individual rights
143
secured by the Constitution. Given the majority's recent propensity
for comparing the stature of state sovereign immunity to that of
individual rights/ 44 the majority probably would view a War Powers
been excluded from international and military affairs. See Hilder, supra note 138, at 828.
140. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 61-62 (1996).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 121-122.
142. Of course, constitutional lines drawn for peacetime application may buckle in
times of war. Whether war alters the interplay between state sovereign immunity and the
government's abrogation authority, however, is well beyond the scope of this article.
143. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1957) (holding that Congress could not
contravene the right to trial by jury through exercise of its War Powers during peacetime).
144. See, e.g., Coli. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 682 (1999) ("State sovereign immunity, no less than the right to trial by jury in
criminal cases, is constitutionally protected."). My own view finds the analogy of state
sovereign immunity to individual rights highly problematic. The Tenth Amendment, for
example, which speaks of states, speaks only of "powers," not "rights," U.S. CONST.
amend. X, even though its precursor, Article 2 of the Articles of Confederation, stated
that: "[E]ach state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power,
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation, expressly delegated to the
United States .... " ART. OF CONFEDERATION art. ·II. Of the states' sovereignty,
freedom, independence, power, jurisdiction, and right, only state "power" graduated to
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exception with great suspicion.
Although a creative Court with different members might use the
War Powers Clause to reopen the door that Seminole Tribe slammed
shut, it seems to me extremely unlikely that the current Court would
ever do so. The majority is set on expanding state sovereign
immunity to the reaches of Article I, without exception. Based on
Seminole Tribe and many of the reasons I explain in the following
Subpart, I am convinced that the Court views Article I as proving no
abrogation authority.
B. The Original Constitution

While Seminole Tribe and its progeny convmce me that the
majority believes state sovereign immunity to extend at least to the
reaches of Article I, the opinions of those cases are meticulously
worded not to extend Seminole Tribe's holding beyond Article I.
Therefore, the question of whether the federal government may
abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to some other Article's
power, such as the Treaty Power of Article II, is more difficult.
Nevertheless, while the Court's opinions are phrased with care, there
are several reasons why the majority does not understand any part of
the entire original Constitution to permit the federal government to
abrogate state sovereign immunity.
First, the Court has often characterized Eleventh Amendment
state sovereign immunity as a limitation on the Article III jurisdiction
of the federal courts. 145 Article III imparts jurisdiction on three
general bases: the source of the law, the subject-matter of the suit, or
the parties in the case. 146 The Eleventh Amendment tracks the party-

the protections of the Tenth Amendment. By contrast, the Ninth Amendment speaks of
"rights," but directs that the "rights" are retained by the people-it grants nothing to the
states. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. Indeed, throughout the Amendments, "rights" are given
to the people, not states. See id. amends. I, II, IV, and VI.
145. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73 ("The Eleventh Amendment restricts the
judicial power under Article III, and Article l cannot be used to circumvent the
constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.").
146. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two
or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of
different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens
or Subjects.").
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47

based language of Article 111/ thus indicating that the drafters of the
Eleventh Amendment meant specifically to address that part of
Article III. The Eleventh Amendment, however, provides no
exceptions based on the constitutional source of the abrogation
attempt; instead, the Amendment's prohibition extends to "any suit
in law or equity." 148 It thus implicitly incorporates the entire sourceof-law-jurisdiction found in Article Ill, which extends to "all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made." 149 Accordingly, the Eleventh
Amendment's restriction applies, if the other requirements are
satisfied, whether the constitutional authorization came from Article
I, Article II, or any other Article. Nothing in the interplay between
the Eleventh Amendment and Article III imparts significance to the
particular source of the law in question. Therefore, because the
Court has held that Article I cannot alter the jurisdictional limits of
Article III (as explained by the Eleventh Amendment and other
aspects of state sovereign immunity), 150 it would be difficult for the
Court to justify how other parts of the original Constitution could do
so. 151
Second, the Court has also proclaimed that the broader principle
of state sovereign immunity affects much more than just Article III
because it is a balance struck by the very federal fabric of the original
Constitution. 152 If so, there is no reason to draw lines of distinction
147. Cf. id. with U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State.").
148. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added).
149. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2.
150. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996).
151. Cf. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 328-32 (1934) (breaking
down the sovereign immunity analysis by Article III distinctions); Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("When we have turned to
consider whether 'a surrender of [state] immunity [is inherent] in the plan of the
convention,' we have discussed that issue under the rubric of the various grants of
jurisdiction in Article III, seeking to determine which of those grants must reasonably be
thought to include suits against the States. We have never gone thumbing through the
Constitution, to see what other original grants of authority-as opposed to Amendments
adopted after the Eleventh Amendment-might justify elimination of state sovereign
immunity.") (internal italics omitted).
152. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999) ("This separate and distinct
structural principle is not directly related to the scope of the judicial power established by
Article III, but inheres in the system of federalism established by the Constitution."); see
also id. at 713 ("[T]he sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited
by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment."); Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports
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between various parts of the original Constitution. The balance exists
as part of the original Plan in toto and does not wax or wane
depending upon the particular constitutional source of a law. 153 The
entire original Constitution is the framework for state sovereign
immunity, and therefore every provision therein is bound by the
federalism constraints it imposes.
Third, the Framers designed the Supremacy Clause of Article
Vt 54 as the primary mechanism to maintain the federal government's
power over the states. The Clause makes all laws and treaties,
irrespective of their source, supreme over state law in almost exactly
the same way and without meaningful distinction. 155 If the Supremacy
Clause does not permit overriding state sovereign immunity under
the authority of Article I statutes, then, ipso facto, neither does it for
laws made under the authority of other provisions of the
Constitution. In effect, Seminole Tribe and its progeny can perhaps
be more appropriately read not as Article I cases, or even as Eleventh
Amendment cases, but rather as Supremacy Clause cases: that the
Supremacy Clause alone does not contemplate the abrogation of state
•
•
•
156
sovereign 1mmumty.

Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753 (2002) ("As a result, the Eleventh Amendment does not define
the scope of the States sovereign immunity; it is but one particular exemplification of that
immunity."); id. at 768 n.18 ("The principle of state sovereign immunity enshrined in our
constitutional framework, however, is not rooted in the Tenth Amendment.").
153. In contrast, the Fourteenth Amendment was specifically designed to alter the
federal-state balance of power struck by the original Constitution. The analysis of those
parts of the Constitution and its Amendments which were affected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, therefore, differs from the analysis of the original Constitution. See infra
Subpart C.
154. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... ").
155. See id. The Founders were concerned with ineffective enforcement of federal
laws (treaties, statutes, and the Articles themselves) against the states under the Articles
of Confederation. They rectified this in the same way: with a Supremacy Clause directed
at all three. See Vazquez, supra note 23, at 733; Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based
Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1108 (1992) ("[I]n the end,
the Framers adopted the very same mechanism for enforcing treaties, federal statutes, and
the Constitution itself. It consisted of the Supremacy Clause and its corollary in Article
III.").
156. For the Court's recent discussion of this concept, see Alden, 527 U.S. at 732-33
("When a State asserts its immunity to suit, the question is not the primacy of federal law
but the implementation of the law in a manner consistent with the constitutional
sovereignty of the States .... [N]either the Supremacy Clause nor the enumerated powers
of Congress confer authority to abrogate the States' immunity from suit in federal
court.").
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Fourth, the Court has resurrected the once-discredited157
rationale that state sovereign immunity protects the dignity of the
158
states.
The dignity of the states is, according to the majority,
offended when the state is called to the bar of an adjudicative
authority. 159 The affront to dignity ostensibly exists irrespective of the
source of the calling, be it powers under Article I or any other
157. See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 315 (1904) ("That [the
Eleventh Amendment's] motive was not to maintain the sovereignty of a state from the
degradation supposed to attend a compulsory appearance before the tribunal of the nation
may be inferred from the terms of the amendment. It does not comprehend controversies
between two or more states, or between a state and a foreign state. The jurisdiction of the
court still extends to these cases; and in these a state may still be sued. We must ascribe
the amendment, then, to some other cause than the dignity of a state."); Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821) ("That its motive was not to maintain the
sovereignty of a State from the degradation supposed to attend a compulsory appearance
before the tribunal of the nation, may be inferred from the terms of the amendment ....
We must ascribe the amendment, then, to some other cause than the dignity of a State.").
The current minority of Court Justices adheres to Marshall's Cohens view. See Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 96-97 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Cohens,
19 U.S. at 406-07); P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139,
151 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (lambasting the justification as "embarrassingly
insufficient").
158. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002)
("States, upon ratification of the Constitution, did not consent to become mere
appendages of the Federal Government."); id. at 760 ("The preeminent purpose of state
sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status as
sovereign entities. The founding generation thought it 'neither becoming nor convenient
that the several States of the Union, invested with that large residuum of sovereignty
which had not been delegated to the United States, should be summoned as defendants to
answer the complaints of private persons."'); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999)
("The generation that designed and adopted our federal system considered immunity from
private suits central to sovereign dignity .... "); id. at 749-50 (discussing the indignity of
coercing unwilling states to appear before a judicial tribunal); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at
58 (explaining that state sovereign immunity serves "to avoid the indignity of subjecting a
State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the insistence of private parties")
(internal quotation marks omitted); Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. at 146; In re Ayers, 123 U.S.
443, 505 (1887) ("The very object and purpose of the eleventh amendment were to
prevent the indignity of subjecting a state to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at
the instance of private parties. It was thought to be neither becoming nor convenient that
the several states of the Union, invested with that large residuum of sovereignty which had
not been delegated to the United States, should be summoned as defendants to answer to
complaints of private persons, whether citizens of other states or aliens, or that the course
of their public policy and the administration of their public affairs should be subject to and
controlled by the mandates of judicial tribunals, without their consent, and in favor of
individual interests.").
159. The Court has used the dignity rationale sweepingly. See, e.g., Federal Mar., 535
U.S. 743 (barring an adjudicative proceeding against a state before an executive agency on
the grounds that the forced appearance offended the state's dignity); Alden, 527 U.S. at
748-49 (explaining that the states' dignity is offended by being coerced into appearing
before their own courts).
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160

Article, so long as it is a federal source.
Finally, the Court has often justified its state sovereign immunity
stance on the recognition that other safeguards exist for state
compliance with the law, such as the good faith of the states to abide
by the law, the chance that a state might consent to suit, the federal
government's ability to sue for enforcement, Section 5 private
161
enforcement, suits brought by other states, and Ex parte Young.
There is no reason to think that these safeguards are less effective
with respect to non-Article I decrees. 162
Like the War Powers analysis, I am sympathetic to the powerful
arguments that certain non-Article I clauses, such as the Treaty
Clause, 163 might provide the federal government with abrogation
164
authority.
The Treaty Clause, for example, exhibits a stark profederal, anti-state balance similar to that inherent in the War Powers
Clauses. 165 It is also arguably beyond the reach of Seminole Tribe
160. There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution about protecting the dignity of the
states. Ironically, then, the justification cannot be tethered to a particular part of the
Constitution and circumvented by resorting to other parts.
161. See Federal Mar., 535 U.S. 743; Alden, 527 U.S. at 755-57, Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 7l n.14.
162. To be sure, commentators have been critical of the sufficiency of these additional
safeguards. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 138 (arguing that governmental agencies have
neither the resources nor the motivation to combat state infractions at a level equal to that
of individual plaintiffs). To the extent these arguments have weight, however, they do not
necessarily have more weight with respect to non-Article I laws. In any case, it could be
argued that the more nationally important state compliance is, the more likely these other
enforcement mechanisms will be employed.
163. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators
present concur .... ").
164. Some commentators have concluded that the treaty power is subject to the
Court's state sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Vazquez, supra note 23, at 715; Mitchell N.
Berman, R. Anthony Reese, Ernest A. Young, State Accountability for Violations of
Intellectual Property Rights: How to "Fix" Florida Prepaid (And How Not To), 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1037, 1188-94 (2001); Jean 0. Melious, Enforcing the Endangered Species Act
Against the States, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 605, 657-58 (2001). Others
have suggested the contrary. See, e.g., Cory Eichhorn, Comment, Eleventh Amendment

Immunity Jurisprudence in an Era of Globalization: The Tension between State Sovereign
Rights and Federal Treaty Obligations, 32 INTER-AM. L. REV. 523 (2001); PeterS. Menell,
Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity from Infringement of Federal
Intellectual Property Rights, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1460-64 (2000); John O'Connor,
Note, Taking TRIPS to the Eleventh Amendment: The Aftermath of the College Savings
Cases, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1003, 1031-40 (2000).
165. The states are prohibited by the Constitution from entering into treaties. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation .... "). And it is widely recognized that the states gave up much of their
sovereignty to the federal government in the arena of foreign affairs. See Zschernig v.
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because it is housed in Article II, not Article 1. 166 Furthermore, the
Treaty Clause's requirement of consent of both a supermajority of
Senators and the President provides internal structural federalism
safeguards; 167 consequently, the exercise of the treaty power might not
need an additional state sovereign immunity safeguard. Also, the
desire for state compliance with treaties is arguably greater than that
for statutes 168 and, in any case, was certainly of paramount concern to
the Framers. 169 Finally, the Court has held, in Missouri v. Holland, 170
Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (developing a dormant foreign affairs power). Professor Peter
Menell suggests that because the states ceded much of their sovereignty with respect to
foreign affairs, domestic cases such as Seminole Tribe and its progeny do not support state
sovereign immunity in the face of a treaty. See Menell, supra note 164164, at 1461 n.240
("States possessed sovereignty with regard to domestic affairs (as would be relevant to the
Commerce Clause and the Patent Clause), but not foreign affairs. These powers have
always resided at the national level. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to read
Florida Prepaid as precluding Congress from abrogating the States' Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity under its treaty or foreign relation powers."). While this position is by
no means indefensible, it unjustifiably conflates state sovereign immunity with all other
attributes of state sovereignty. The position more aligned with the Court's recent opinions
is that the states, while ceding much of their sovereign regulatory authority over foreign
affairs to the federal government, did not cede that part of their sovereignty which enables
them to resist suits by private individuals, even in the face of a national foreign affairs
power. As the Court has reiterated, it is not dispositive that a power resides exclusively in
the hands of the federal government. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535
U.S. 743 (2002); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996).
166. See Robert Knowles, Starbucks and the New Federalism: The Court's Answer to
Globalization, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 735, 740 (2001) ("The inclusion of the Treaty Clause
within Article II gives it special significance: it provides a unique and independent grant of
power to the federal government.").
167. Structural federalism safeguards include equal state suffrage in the Senate, the
Senate supermajority requirement, and the Electoral College. As originally conceived, the
first two requirements ostensibly safeguarded state interests because senators were
selected by the state legislatures. Now, of course, these protections have been winnowed
by the Seventeenth Amendment, which eliminated state selection of senators in favor of
direct election by the people. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. Nevertheless, the modern Court
has relied upon these federalism protections to restrict state sovereignty in the Tenth
Amendment context. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551
n.ll (1985).
168. See Vazquez, supra note 23, at 729-30. One nation's breach of a treaty provision
entitles non-breaching nations to void the treaty. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 280
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (James Madison) ("It is an established doctrine on the subject
of treaties, that all the articles are mutually conditions of each other; that a breach of any
one article is a breach of the whole treaty; and that a breach committed by either of the
parties, absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they please, to pronounce the compact
violated and void."); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199,261 (1796) (Iredell, J.) ("It is a
part of the law of nations, that if a treaty be violated by one party, it is at the option of the
other party, if innocent, to declare, in consequence of the breach, that the treaty is void.").
169. See THE FEDERALIST No.3, at 42-45 (John Jay)(Ciinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
also Vazquez, supra note 155, at 1102-03.
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that Congress could implement a treaty without transgressing the
Tenth Amendment even though the implementing statute was not
authorized under any enumerated power. 171
Despite the appeal of some of these points, I believe the current
majority would not permit treaties to override state sovereign
immunity. 172 Aside from the reasons I have already articulated that
cover the Treaty Clause and the rest of the original Constitution,
several other reasons specific to treaties lend support to that position.
There is a contextual argument against recognizing the Treaty
Clause as containing abrogation authority. After the present version
of the Eleventh Amendment was introduced in the Senate, Senator
Albert Gallatin moved to amend the resolution to exempt "cases
arising under treaties, made under the authority of the United States"
from the Amendment's circumscription of Article III. 173 The proposal
was rejected, which could indicate that the Eleventh Amendment,
and thus state sovereign immunity, was not intended to be susceptible
to the Treaty Clause. 174
Historical evidence demonstrates that treaties were not
understood to be mechanisms for circumventing states' rights. At the
Convention, Edmund Randolph stated: "[N)either the life nor
property of any citizen, nor the particular right of any state, can be
affected by a treaty." 175 Thomas Jefferson wrote later that the treaty
power could not supercede "the rights reserved to the states; for
170. 252 u.s. 416 (1920).
171. See id. at 432 ("To answer this question it is not enough to refer to the Tenth
Amendment, reserving the powers not delegated to the United States, because by Article ·
2, Section 2, the power to make treaties is delegated expressly, and by Article 6 treaties
made under the authority of the United States, along with the Constitution and laws of the
United States made in pursuance thereof, are declared the supreme law of the land. If the
treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article 1,
Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government.").
172. Several lower courts agree. See, e.g., Atl. Legal States Found. v. Babbit, 83 F.
Supp. 2d 344 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
173. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 30 (1794).
174. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 735 (1999) ("Congress' refusal to modify the
text of the Eleventh Amendment to create an exception to sovereign immunity for cases
arising under treaties ... suggests the States' sovereign immunity was understood to
extend beyond state-law causes of action."). Of course, it is also possible that the
amendment was rejected for other reasons, such as a preference for a total repeal of
diversity jurisdiction under Article III, see James E. Pfander, History and State Suability:
An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1362
(1998), or a belief that the additional language was unnecessary, see Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 287 n.40 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
175. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 33, at 469,504 (Edmund Randolph).
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surely the President and Senate cannot do by treaty what the whole
176
Despite their
government is interdicted from doing in any way."
fear that the states might resist treaty obligations, the Framers
understood the treaty power to be limited by federalism concerns.
The Court itself has recognized that the Treaty Power is limited
by federalism considerations. 177 Treaties must be "not inconsistent
with the nature of our government and the relation between the
States and the United States," 178 and that the treaty power covers all
matters "which are consistent with the nature of our institutions, and
the distribution of powers between the general and state
governments." 179 In Reid v. Covert/ 80 a plurality of the Court
explained:
It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who
created the Constitution, as well as those who were responsible
for the Bill of Rights-let alone alien to our entire
constitutional history and tradition-to construe Article VI as
permitting the United States to exercise power under an
international agreement without observing constitutional
prohibitions . . . . The prohibitions of the Constitution were
designed to apply to all branches of the National Government
and they cannot be nullified by the Executive or by the
181
Executive and the Senate combined.
Missouri v. Holland 182 is consistent with the reasoning in Reid.
Justice Holmes explicitly acknowledged that the treaty in that case
was not limited by the passive Tenth Amendment. 183 He was careful

176. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice: For the Use of the
Senate of the United States (1812), reprinted in JEFFERSON'S PARLIAMENTARY WRITINGS
at 421(Wilber S. Howell ed., 1988).
177. Even Justice Holmes in Holland disavowed a limitless treaty power. See Missouri
v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) ("We do not mean to imply that there are no
qualifications to the treaty-making power; but they must be ascertained in a different
way.").
178. Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211,243 (1872).
179. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569 (1840).
180. 354 u.s. 1 (1957).
181. Reid, 354 U.S. at 17. Although only four Justices in Reid joined this particular
language, Justice Frankfurter joined the proposition that neither treaties nor their
implementing legislation could trump express constitutional rights. /d. at 41 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring). Other cases express similar language. See, e.g., Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S.
258, 267 (1890) ("It would not be contended that [the treaty power] extends so far as to
authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the government or
in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter,
without its consent.").
182. 252 u.s. 416 (1920).
183. /d. at 434; U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United
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not to imply that the treaty power permitted what was otherwise
affirmatively prohibited by the Constitution. 1H4 The distinction is
critical. The current Court's conception of state sovereign immunity
does not radiate from the Tenth Amendment, 1s5 although it has been
186
so misinterpreted. Rather, according to the Court, state sovereign
immunity is an affirmative-and express, in the case of the Eleventh
Amendment-limitation on judicial power. Consequently, a treatysovereign immunity case would fall more appropriately under Reid
than Holland. Under Reid, the treaty power cannot override such
constitutional prohibitions as state sovereign immunity. 187 Indeed, the
current majority has already intimated that state sovereign immunity
shields states from treaty claims. 188
Additionally, permitting the government to abrogate through
treaties, but not statutes, would work a number of paradoxes in both
theory and practice. Statutes and treaties stand on equal footing, 189
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."). The text of the Tenth Amendment affirmatively grants
nothing; it is a tautological confirmation of the obvious. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 124 (1941).
184. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 433-34 ("The treaty in question does not contravene any
prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution. The only question is whether it is
forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment.").
185. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) ("The
principle of state sovereign immunity enshrined in our constitutional framework, however,
is not rooted in the Tenth Amendment."). One commentator has suggested that the state
sovereignty principles enshrined in the Tenth Amendment should yield to federal foreign
affairs authorities such as the treaty power. See Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to Be a
Nation? Federal Power vs. "States' Rights" in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1277
(1999). Whether or not persuasive, this argument does not control the question of state
sovereign immunity, which neither derives from, nor is confined by, the Tenth
Amendment. Thus, the restrictions on the Tenth Amendment do not necessarily translate
to limit state sovereign immunity.
186. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 761 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("There is no
evidence that the Tenth Amendment constitutionalized a concept of sovereign immunity
as inherent in the notion of statehood .... ").
187. Commentators have objected that the right at issue in Reid was an individual
right, as opposed to a state right, see, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 185, at 1300 (noting that the
right at issue in Reid was the individual right to a trial by jury), but it is doubtful that the
current majority would see this distinction as significant. See Coil. Sav. Bank v. Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 682 (1999) ("State sovereign
immunity, no less thim the right to trial by jury in criminal cases, is constitutionally
protected.").
188. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377 (1998) (per curiam) (suggesting that
Paraguay's claims against a state for a treaty violation would be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment).
189. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("By the Constitution a treaty
is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both
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190

and one can override the other.
If state sovereign immunity
extended only to Article I, a treaty could override state sovereign
immunity, but a subsequent statute could only reduce-as opposed to
expand-the states' exposure. This situation is not an impossibility,
but it is rather peculiar191 and could work difficulties in practice.' 92
Also, in the event the United States ratifies a non-self-executing
treaty 193 requiring state suability, Congress would be unable to
implement (and the courts unable to enforce) that requirement, even
194
though the nation would still be bound by the treaty conditions.
Lastly, the emergence of an international community and global
identity have blurred many of the demarcations the Founders initially
envisioned between treaties and statutes. Today, Congress regularly
enacts statutes with ramifications far beyond domestic borders, 195 and
196
congressional-executive agreements have somewhat usurped the
are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy
is given to either over the other."); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)
("Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be
regarded in Courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature .... ").
190. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 376 ("We have held 'that an Act of Congress ... is on full
parity with a treaty, and that when a statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent
with a treaty, the statute to the extent of [a] conflict renders the treaty null."') (quoting
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957)); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) ("In
short, we are of [the] opinion that, so far as a treaty made by the United States with any
foreign nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country,
it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or
repeal.").
191. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 18 ("It would be completely anomalous to say that a treaty
need not comply with the Constitution when such an agreement can be overriden by a
statute that must conform to that instrument.").
192. For example, Congress might desire to alter the treaty abrogation by narrowing it
in some aspects but broadening it in others, with the overall effect of reducing state
exposure. It would be an undecided question whether such an attempt would be
constitutional.
193. Treaties can be either self-executing, which are immediately enforceable, or nonself-executing, which require implementation by congressional statute. Compare Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (self-executing), and
Cook v. United States 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933) (self-executing), with Edye v. Robertson,
112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (non-self-executing).
194. This result assumes that implementing statutes are identical to Article I statutes
for state sovereign immunity purposes. Because both derive their authorization from the
Necessary and Proper Clause, see Missiouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) and Neely
v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 121-22 (1901), the assumption is a strong one.
195. Congress has the power to legislate foreign affairs not covered by its enumerated
powers, even though the Constitution does not expressly authorize such legislation. See
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299
u.s. 304, 318 (1936).
196. Though they circumvent the Senate supermajority requirement of treaties,
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traditional treaty role. Because international statutes, congressionalexecutive agreements, and treaties are used interchangeably as a
practical matter/ 97 it would be problematic to differentiate between
them on state sovereign immunity grounds. The slew of anomalies
and uncertainties which a treaty exception to state sovereign
immunity would create stands in the way of the current majority's
rule-oriented jurisprudence.
For these reasons, the current majority's understanding of state
sovereign immunity leaves no room for a treaty exception. Such an
exception, while supported by some evidence, would enable plaintiffs
to end-run around one of the Court's favorite state rights. This the
majority would not sanction. Rather, state sovereign immunity is a
principle which pervades the entire original Constitution, and nothing
therein contains the power to override it. 198
C. Amendments

Having determined that the Court's understanding recognizes
state sovereign immunity as a limitation on the powers of the federal
government as conceived in the original Constitution, the question
remains whether the various Amendments to the Constitution either
changed the contours of Hamilton's plan for state sovereign immunity
or provided Congress with certain limited powers to abrogate.
The Court answered that question in at least one context.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendmene 99 authorizes Congress to
subject the states to private suit for the purpose of enforcing the
mandates of that Amendment. 200 The Fourteenth Amendment does
congressional-executive agreements are accorded the same stature as treaties. They are
both constitutional and supreme with respect to state laws, just as federal statutes and
treaties are. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); see generally Bruce
Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 801 {1995).
197. In recent years, treaties and congressional-executive agreements have invaded a
host of domestic and state-province issues. See Knowles, supra note 166, at 749-50.
198. Professor Bandes argues for a clause-specific state sovereign immunity inquiry, at
least with respect to the Treaty Power. See Bandes, supra note 23, at 747. Her point is
that the "plan of the convention" is the pertinent guidepost, and that "it is still necessary
to determine the current scope of state sovereignty by examining the 'structural principles
inherent in our system of federalism."' /d. (quoting Jackson, supra note 23, at 1277). I do
not disagree; I only suggest that a current majority of the Court understands Hamilton's
rubric to be a structural rule already dispositive of the examination, and that the Court
would be more willing to rely on that rule than sew together a patchwork quilt of ad hoc
clause-by-clause analyses.
199. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 {"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
200. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
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so, according to the Court, because it specifically contemplates direct
201
congressional regulation of the states and dramatically altered the
202
federal-state balance of power in favor of the federal government.
Based on Fitzpatrick, it is virtually a foregone conclusion that the
other Amendments with enforcement clauses directed at regulating
204
the states203 also provide Congress a limited abrogation power.
Indeed, because the Civil War Amendments' shift in the federal-state
balance is ostensibly still in effect today, any Amendments enacted
after the Fourteenth would have been ratified on the understanding
that the federal-state balance of power, and its contingent effects on
state sovereign immunity, had changed. Thus, any post-Civil War
Amendment arguably possesses inherent abrogation potential.
The more interesting question is whether those Amendments
205
ratified before the Eleventh Amendment also allow abrogation.
Although not a part of the original Constitution, and therefore
arguably not constrained by the original plan's federalism framework,
the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791, only a few years after the
original Constitution took effect and was contemplated well
beforehand. It is highly improbable that the majority would ascribe
both to the "profound shock" theory of Chisholm and to. a
contemporaneous consent to private suits under the first ten
Amendments. The Court's opinions assume that the balance of
federal-state power struck by the original Constitution remained
relatively static until the Civil War Amendments,206 a time period

201. See id. at 453; see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996)
("We noted that § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contained prohibitions expressly
directed at the States and that § 5 of the Amendment expressly provided that 'The
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article."') (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 5).
202. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455; see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (explaining
that the Fourteenth Amendment "fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal
power struck by the Constitution").
203. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII,§ 2, XV,§ 2, XIX, XXIV,§ 2, XXVI,§ 2.
204. See Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARV. L.
REV. 102, 107 n.33 (1996); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other
Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit upon the States, 126 U.
PA. L. REV. 1203, 1228-29 (1978).
205. I say Eleventh Amendment here because the Thirteenth Amendment, which
outlaws slavery, is a Civil War Amendment in the same vein as the Fourteenth, and the
Twelfth Amendment, which merely limits the term of the President, provides no basis for
a cause of action against a state. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XII.
206. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65-66 (stating that before the Civil War
Amendments were adopted, there existed a "pre-existing balance between state and
federal power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment").
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inclusive of the ratification of the Bill of Rights. This is no great
surprise. The Bill of Rights originally granted the people various civil
rights vis-a-vis the federal government but not vis-a-vis the state
governments.207 Under their original meaning, the pre-Eleventh
Amendments clearly did not contemplate abrogation of state
sovereign immunity.
But the Civil War convinced the nation of the need to curb
abusive state infringements on individual liberties. The Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified in response, and the Due Process Clause has
been held to incorporate the following individual rights against state
infringemeneos the First Amendment's protections of free speech,209
. of re1'tgwn,
. 212 an d
free press,210 free d om of assem bly; 211 free exercise
non-establishment;213 the Fourth Amendment's restrictions on

207. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-49 (1833) (emphasizing this
point); see also, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (explicitly restricting "Congress" but nowhere
mentioning the states). Curiously, the first ten Amendments were originally quite
defensive of state authority. They permitted states to, for example, establish a state
church (which some did), while at the same time insulating such establishments from
intrusion by the federal government by barring Congress from making any law respecting
an establishment of religion. See Akhil Reed Amar, Hugo Black and the Hall of Fame, 53
ALA. L. REV. 1221, 1223-24 (2002).
208. The Due Process Clause is arguably the wrong Clause to incorporate named
rights against the states. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment-"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States"-by its terms would incorporate all the
rights of U.S. citizens found in the Bill of Rights and bind the states with them. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. But the Court in 1873 held that clause virtually powerless. See
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (16 Wall.) (1873); see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S.
489, 521 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that "the Court all but read the Privileges
or Immunities Clause out of the Constitution"); Stanley Morrison, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140, 144 (1949) (proclaiming
that the Court had rendered the Clause "practically a dead letter"). As a result, the
burden of impressing civil rights and Reconstruction notions of fairness upon the states
fell upon the inauspicious Due Process Clause. Revisiting The Slaughter-House Cases'
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could
result in an expanded congressional abrogation power. See William J. Rich, Privileges or
Immunities: The Missing Link in Establishing Congressional Power to Abrogate State
Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235 (2001) (arguing that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment creates a broad
abrogation power).
209. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664 (1925); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359,368 (1931).
210. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,707 (1931).
211. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353,364 (1937).
212. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
213. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).

Summer 2002]

METES AND BOUNDS

763

warrants, searches, and seizures;214 the Fifth Amendment's
proscriptions against taking property without just compensation,215
compelled self-incrimination,216 and double-jeopardy; 217 the Sixth
Amendment's rights to a public trial,218 to counsel,219 to confront
accusers, 220 to a speedy trial, 221 to compulsory process,222 and to a jury
trial; 223 and the Eighth Amendment's bans on cruel and unusual
24
punishmene and excessive bail. 225 The Court has also interpreted the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause to contain a Fourteenth
Amendment-type Equal Protection component. 226 In each of these
cases, the Court has defined the protected liberty as a "fundamental
right" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 227 The only major
exceptions are the Second Amendment's right to keep and bear arms,
the Fifth Amendment's grand jury requirement, and the Seventh
Amendment's preservation of a right to civil trial by jury. 228
Thus, in the wake of the Civil War, the states ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment and through that act made most of the first
eight Amendments applicable to themselves. The individual rights
enshrined in those Amendments and incorporated into the Due
Process Clause are therefore protectable by Congress through
abrogation of state sovereign immunity. However, the provisions
contained in the original Constitution provide no abrogation power. 229
214. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) (Fourth Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) (exclusionary rule).
215. Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,241 (1897).
216. Mallory v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
217. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793 (1969).
218. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
219. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
220. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,403 (1965).
221. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213,222-23 (1967).
222. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967).
223. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
224. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
225. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971).
226. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
227. Although the Court has never fully endorsed Justice Hugo Black's bright-line
theory that the Bill of Rights was "incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment, see
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), it has very nearly
reached the same result by categorizing each right individually as "fundamental."
228. The Third Amendment has not been incorporated either, but it makes few
appearances in the annals of constitutional law.
229. Because I have argued that the Fourteenth Amendment permits abrogation
pursuant to Amendments that were not understood to permit abrogation before the
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State sovereign immunity, therefore, is inviolable within the confines
of the original document; outside those confines, however, the tide
turns, and Congress is empowered to abrogate it in appropriate
circumstances.

IV. Conclusion
I make no intimation of my own views of state sovereign

Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, I take seriously Professor Vicki Jackson's musings
that the Fourteenth Amendment also may have shifted the federal-state power balance
with respect to parts of the original Constitution. See Jackson, supra note 23. She argues
that the Fourteenth Amendment's shift in federal-state power could have expanded
Congress' Article I enumerated powers to permit abrogation. See id. Indeed, her
argument generally supports my identification of the abrogation power in Amendments
antedating the Eleventh Amendment. But I do not believe the current majority would
sanction its expansion to the original Constitution.
The Fourteenth Amendment did not affect all of the Constitution's provisions in the same
way. The Amendment was specifically directed at the unfair and unequal treatment of
citizens by states. Although the Bill of Rights initially restrained only the federal
government, it listed those basic individual civil liberties deemed "fundamental" to
fairness and equality. That those liberties should be made applicable to the states, and
that Congress was enabled to enact appropriate enforcements in derogation of the
Eleventh Amendment to sanction the recalcitrant states, is no stretch. It is an entirely
different matter to read the Fourteenth Amendment as expanding Congress' Article I
powers, such as the Commerce Clause power, to fit the Fourteenth Amendment's
purposes. The Commerce Clause simply does not have the same focus as the
Amendments. Moreover, to permit the expansion of an enumerated power beyond what
Article I expressly permits would threaten the very concept of limited government to
which the majority very much adheres. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 61519 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-22 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514
u.s. 549, 579-80 (1995).
I therefore do not believe the Court would maintain that the Fourteenth Amendment
fundamentally changed the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment or expanded parts of
the original Constitution in ways permitting abrogation. Rather, the Fourteenth poked
holes in the Eleventh in a very selective way not applicable to the original Constitution.
Section 5 permits abrogation, despite the Eleventh Amendment and structural principles
of state sovereign immunity, when necessary to prevent state abridgment of certain
fundamental rights protected by the Constitution.
This is not to say that Professor Jackson's theory is neither thought-provoking nor correct.
I am simply skeptical, as is she, see Jackson, supra note'23, at 1263,1307 n.172, that there
is much room in the Court's federalism juggernaut for it. Cf Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1, 42 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The plurality asserts that it is no more
impossible for provisions of the Constitution adopted concurrently with Article III to
permit abrogation of state sovereign immunity than it is for provisions adopted
subsequently. We do not dispute that that is possible, but only that it happened .... An
interpretation of the original Constitution which permits Congress to eliminate sovereign
immunity only if it wants to renders the doctrine a practical nullity and is therefore
unreasonable. The Fourteenth Amendment, on the other hand, was avowedly directed
against the power of the States, and permits abrogation of their sovereign immunity only
for a limited purpose.") (italics in original).
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immunity; rather, my goal is to distill a coherent structural rule for the
Court's state sovereign immunity jurisprudence.
Under that
understanding, the line between state sovereign immunity and
abrogation authority is most tenably drawn at the outskirts of the
original Constitution. There are weaknesses to such a rule-perhaps
even exceptions. 230 But they will be exceptions which prove the
existence of the rule in the first place.

230. The obvious exception is Congress' Spending Clause power. U.S. CONST. art. I,§
8, cl. 1. As I have noted, however, that power is a solicitation of voluntary waiver, not
forced abrogation. See supra note 18. In that respect, the Spending Clause is the
"exception" that proves the rule. More intriguing is the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."). That Clause speaks
directly to the states and restricts state authority in favor of individuals, just as the
Fourteenth Amendment does. Moreover, Publius, in interpreting the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, suggested that the federal courts should have jurisdiction over
controversies between citizens and states arising under its dictates. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 80, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) ("[T]he citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the several States' ... [i]t will
follow that ... the national judiciary ought to preside in all cases in which one State or its
citizens are opposed to another state or its citizens.'"). This statement by Publius is
extremely revealing. The rule that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of the several states implies a right for citizens only, not states.
Thus, in a controversy arising under that rule, only citizens could logically be plaintiffs.
When Publius then immediately discusses the jurisdiction of the federal courts over such
controversies, he must necessarily be contemplating jurisdiction over suits brought by
private citizens against a state. To my knowledge, no one has extensively addressed how
Article IV itself relates to state sovereign immunity and congressional abrogation. Cf.
Rich, supra note 208208, at 241-49 (analyzing the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV as support for his principal theory that the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges
or Immunities Clause creates a broad abrogation power).

